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Local Land Use Decisions in States
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Healthful Environment
Michelle Bryan Mudd*
This Article examines the role local governments play in four states
that have constitutional rights to a healthful environment-Illinois,
Pennsylvania, Montana, and Hawaii. Scholars such as John R. Nolon and
Patricia E. Salkin have long noted that local governments work as quiet yet
integral third partners with state and federal government by addressing
environmental issues through land use regulation. For local governments
in environmental rights states, environmental protection is not just an
aspiration, but a constitutional mandate. Indeed, environmental rights
cannot be fully protected without the strong engagement of local
government.
This Article describes the constitutional provisions of Illinois,
Pennsylvania, Montana, and Hawaii, and summarizes how the
environmental rights case law intersects with the land use law in each state.
Here, the Article updates much earlier comparative scholarship on
environmental rights, using a land use lens. It also builds on the
observations of Barton "Buzz" Thompson and other environment rights
scholars who have noted a gap between the constitutional right to a
healthful environment and its regulatory implementation. It is local
government that can fill much of this gap.
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Next, this Article combines the theoretical with the practical by
presenting a checklist of topics that local governments can consider in
designing regulations that protect environmental rights. Even in states
lacking a constitutional right provision, local governments can benefit from
the practical suggestions offered here. By stepping up to meet their
constitutional obligation, local governments in environmental rights states
are poised to become leaders in creating and implementing robust
environmental land use provisions.
Decision makers will be faced with the constant and difficult task of
weighing conflicting environmental and social concerns in arriving at
a course of action that will be expedient as well as reflective of the
high priority which constitutionally has been placed on the
conservation of our natural, scenic, esthetic and historical resources.
-Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, Payne v. Kassab'
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INTRODUCION
From small mountain villages to sprawling, beachfront metropolises,
local governments stand on the front lines of environmental regulation.
While federal and state agencies figure prominently in environmental
law, local governments work as quieter yet integral third partners by
addressing environmental issues during the planning and regulating of
land use.2 Local jurisdiction extends into areas not reached by federal and
state laws, and local officials are most familiar with the resources in their
communities. Thus, a local government's role in assessing the
environmental impacts of land development can be profound. A silent
community puts the health of its environment at risk.
In a select group of states, a healthful environment is not just an
aspiration, but a constitutional duty.3 Since the 1970s, the constitutions of
2. For an extensive discussion of the advent of local environmental law, see generally
John R. Nolon, In Praise of Parochialism: The Advent of Local Environmental Law, 26 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REv. 365 (2002), reprinted in The Intersection of Environmental and Land Use Law,
23 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 821 (special ed. 2006) [hereinafter In Praise of Parochialism]. For
additional articles discussing the vital role of local government in environmental protection see,
for example, Pamela Corrie, Comment, An Assessment of the Role of Local Government in
Environmental Regulation, 5 UCLA J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 145, 145-48 (1986); Nestor M.
Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era of State Sovereignty, 93
VA. L. REv. 959, 972-73 & n.47 (2007); A. Dan Tarlock, The Potential Role of Local
Governments in Watershed Management, 20 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 149, 156-61 (2002).
3. Those states include Hawaii, HAW. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1, 7, 9, Illinois, ILL. CONST. art.
XI, §§ 1-2, Massachusetts, MASS. CONST. amends. art. XCVII, Montana, MONT. CONST. art. II, §
3, art. XI, §§ 1-3, Pennsylvania, PA. CONST. art. I, § 27, and sometimes Rhode Island, R.I.
CONST. art. I, § 17, although the right mentioned in the Rhode Island Constitution reads more
like a public trust right for access to natural resources, rather than a broader right to a healthy
environment. New York also is sometimes listed in this group, but its constitution differs in that
it recognizes a citizen's right to standing to enforce environmental laws but does not expressly
recognize a personal right to a healthy environment in and of itself. N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, §§ 4-
5.
Nearly every state constitution mentions natural resources or the environment, most
often in a public policy statement. See Bret Adams et al., Environmental and Natural Resources
3
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Illinois, Pennsylvania, Montana, and Hawaii have recognized the right to
a healthful environment 4-a right that local governments, as creatures of
these states, must help uphold. And while the local government duty is
apparent, the path to meeting it can be arduous. Local governments
struggle with the practical realities of how to assess environmental
impacts alongside a host of other considerations, including landowner
and community interests in using land. These struggles often take place
under state enabling legislation that does not expressly address
constitutional obligations, or may even undermine those obligations. Yet
despite the challenges, the constitutional obligation remains. With these
environmental rights' approaching their fourth decade of existence, the
time is overdue for local governments to heed their constitutional calling.
This Article presents a practical path for local governments
navigating the complexities of an environmental rights provision in their
state constitution. Even in states lacking such a provision, local
governments can benefit from the practical suggestions the Article
provides.' Indeed, it behooves all local governments to proactively
develop a mastery of environmental issues, rather than to relinquish
regulatory opportunity to state legislatures or to courts ill-equipped to
handle the scientifically complex, polycentric problems of each
community.'
Provisions in State Constitutions, 22 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 73, 74 (2002). The above-
listed states, however, stand apart in having a declared, affirmative "right" to a healthful
environment. Richard 0. Brooks, A Constitutional Right to a Healthful Environment, 16 VT. L.
REv. 1063, 1104 (1991) (identifying five categories of environmental provisions in state
constitutions, of which affirmative rights statements are one); see also Anil S. Karia, A Right to a
Clean and Healthy Environment: A Proposed Amendment to Oregon's Constitution, 14 U. BALT.
J. ENVTL. L. 37, 42-44 (2006). For a broader comparative analysis of environmental provisions in
state constitutions, see generally Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Environmental Policy and State
Constitutions: The Potential Role of Substantive Guidance, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 863 (1996)
[hereinafter Substantive Guidance]; Robert A. McLaren, Comment, Environmental Protection
Based on State Constitutional Law: A Call for Reinterpretation, 12 U. HAW. L. REv. 123 (1990).
4. This Article will not focus on Massachusetts. To date Massachusetts case law has
involved the public policy portion of the state's constitutional provision, and an attempt by an
individual to enforce the "right" portion of the constitutional provision was rejected for lack of
standing, without any explanation. See Enos v. Sec'y of Envtl. Affairs, 731 N.E.2d 525, 532 n.7
(2000); see also Mary Ellen Cusack, Judicial Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights to a
Healthful Environment, 20 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REv. 173, 185-86 (1993). Thus, there is an
insufficient body of case law to draw upon.
5. The phrase "environmental rights" is used throughout the article to denote the
constitutional right to a healthful environment contained in the state constitutions of Illinois,
Pennsylvania, Montana, and Hawaii. See supra text accompanying notes 3-4.
6. In states without a right, there is likely a constitutional policy provision, an
environmental statutory scheme, or both. See Thompson, supra note 3, at 867-80, tbls.1, 2, 3, 4 &
5.
7. See John C. Dernbach, Taking the Pennsylvania Constitution Seriously when It Protects
the Environment: Part I-An Interpretative Framework for Article I, Section 27, 103 DICK. L.
REv. 693, 725-26 (1999) ("The scientific and technical complexity of environmental problems,
the existence of competing policies, and the economic and social consequences of environmental
4 [38:1
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Part I argues that local governments in environmental rights states
are constitutionally bound to safeguard the environment, both through
regulation and use of the courts. Part II then focuses on the specific legal
context of each environmental rights state, summarizing the interface
between that state's environmental rights case law and land use law. This
comparative analysis reveals some remarkable differences among the
four states, as well as important commonalities that help us predict future
developments in environmental rights jurisprudence. Part III then moves
to the practical level, providing a checklist of topics that local
governments should consider when designing a regulatory framework for
environmental rights protection. This checklist is drawn from a survey of
cases and statutes in the environmental rights states, and recommends
such steps as strengthened planning documents, codified environmental
review criteria, clarified evidentiary requirements, and required
monitoring for compliance. Although variations in state law require some
differences in approach, the Article concludes that when local
governments proactively address environmental issues, they create
processes that better protect the environment, provide predictability for
landowners, and are more likely to withstand judicial review.
I. WHY LOCAL GOVERNMENT
A. Local Governments Have Both the Authority and the Obligation to
Safeguard the Constitutional Right to a Healthful Environment
1. Express and Implied Regulatory Authority
At the same time that state constitutions began addressing
environmental issues in the 1970s, courts began ruling that local
governments had implied authority to regulate environmental harms
under their existing police powers-those traditional powers to protect
public health, safety, and welfare. By this time nearly all states had
already delegated to local governments the power to plan, zone, and
conduct subdivision review under the police powers.! The Standard State
Zoning Enabling Act, which most states had adopted in some form,
empowered local governments to zone "for the purpose of promoting
health, safety, morals, or the general welfare of the community."
9 And
the Standard City Planning Enabling Act authorized planning and review
protection put resolution of most environmental matters outside the expertise and ordinary role
of judges.").
8. See 1PATRICIA E. SALKIN, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §§ 2.9-.11 (5th ed. 2010).
9. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT § 1 (rev. ed.
1926).
5
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of land divisions "to best promote health, safety, morals, order,
convenience, prosperity, and general welfare.""o Originating in the 1920s,
these and similar enabling statutes were unlikely to explicitly mention
environmental protection as a matter within a local government's
regulatory purview.
Despite this lack of explicit language, the courts in many jurisdictions
began finding an implied authority to address environmental harms
within the ambit of the local government's police powers.' A Florida
court's statement in the 1977 case of Moviematic Industries Corp. v.
Board of County Commissionersl2 is representative of the trend: "We find
the inclusion of ecological considerations as a legitimate objective of
zoning ordinances and resolutions is long overdue and hold that
preservation of the ecological balance of a particular area is a vaiid
exercise of the police power as it relates to the general welfare."" In
Moviematic, Dade County, Florida, imposed building restrictions over the
Biscayne Aquifer, which the court described as "one of the most
permeable aquifers in the world" and a major source of the county's
drinking water supply.14 Land overlaying the aquifer contained a blue-
green algae mat that filtered out pollutants before they reached the
groundwater. Development threatened to destroy the algae mat and
expose the drinking water supply to pollutants." The court rejected the
landowner's argument that the county lacked authority to restrict land
development for environmental reasons, concluding that the police
powers include the right to protect the "ecological balance" of an area."
A few years earlier, in Nattin Realty, Inc. v. Ludewig, a New York
court similarly upheld a rezoning in the Town of Wappinger that
prevented a landowner from building a planned 342-unit apartment
complex because of the risk of sewage system failure and potential harm
to adequate water supply." The court held:
Respecting ecology as a new factor, it appears that the time has
come-if, indeed, it has not already irretrievably passed-for the
courts, as it were, to take "ecological notice" in zoning matters.
10. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING Act § 7 (1928).
11. This trend is summarized aptly by Nolon in In Praise of Parochialism, supra note 2, at
377-86. See, e.g., Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Moorman, 664 So. 2d 930, 933 (Fla. 1995);
Moviematic Indus. Corp. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 349 So. 2d 667, 669-70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1977); Gardner v. N.J. Pinelands Comm'n, 593 A.2d 251, 257 (N.J. 1991); Nattin Realty, Inc. v.
Ludewig, 324 N.Y.S.2d 668, 672 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971).
12. Moviematic Indus. Corp., 349 So. 2d 667.
13. Id. at 669.
14. Id. at 670.
15. See id. at 669-70.
16. See id.
17. Nattin Realty, Inc. v. Ludewig, 324 N.Y.S.2d 668, 672 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971).
6 [38:1
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. . . [Tihe municipality has here presented sufficient evidence to
warrant the rezoning of the petitioner's property, for it was prompted
to do so by ecological considerations based not upon whim or fancy
but upon scientific findings. The definition of "public health, safety
and welfare" surely must now be broadened to include and to provide
for these belatedly recognized threats and hazards to the public weal.
The Town's decision to forego what, undoubtedly, would be
substantial additional tax revenue would appear to constitute a
recognition that it as well as an owner must subordinate immediate to
long-term interests.
The court is not unmindful that zoning changes prompted by such
environmental considerations may appreciably limit the uses and
profitability of land; yet if both factors were to be placed upon the
scales, the Pro bono publico considerations must prevail. If there is
substantial evidence sustaining the municipality's determination to
rezone because of ecology, the court should not void such legislative
determination. 8
While neither the Florida Constitution nor the New York
Constitution contains a right to a healthful environment, both notably
have environmental public policy statements that can serve as support for
local regulation of the environment." Indeed, the Florida Supreme Court
has cited the Florida Constitution as additional authority for the
conclusion that environmental regulation falls within local government
police powers.'
States with environmental rights provisions arguably have an even
stronger basis for implied authority, and the courts of those states have
recognized as much. The convention transcripts to the Montana
Constitution indicate the delegates' belief that police powers formed a
basis for enforcing environmental rights,2 1 and the Montana Supreme
Court has accordingly concluded that "environmental regulations
represent a reasonable exercise of the police power."22 Pennsylvania
courts have held that a public body must address "ecological
18. Id.
19. See FLA. CONST. art. II, § 7(a) ("It shall be the policy of the state to conserve and
protect its natural resources and scenic beauty. Adequate provision shall be made by law for the
abatement of air and water pollution and of excessive and unnecessary noise and for the
conservation and protection of natural resources."); N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 4 ("The policy of
the state shall be to conserve and protect its natural resources and scenic beauty . . .
20. See Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Moorman, 664 So. 2d 930, 932 (Fla. 1995).
21. See Verbatim Transcript of March 1, 1972, 5 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION 1223 (1971-72).
22. Seven Up Pete Venture v. State, 2005 MT 146, 327 Mont. 306, 114 P.3d 1009, 1023
(citing W. Energy Co. v. Genie Land Co., 635 P.2d 1297, 1302 (Mont. 1981)). This holding is in
the context of state police powers, but the same result presumably would be reached for local
police powers.
7
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considerations" as a relevant factor when exercising its police powers.'
Illinois and Hawaii courts have similarly held that preventing pollution
and other environmental harms falls within the police powers.24
The 1970s also saw a rise in state and federal responses to select
categories of environmental concern. For many state legislatures, this
response included supplementing local government enabling statutes to
expressly authorize some environmental regulation in land use.' This
delegation acknowledges the difficulties for states to micro-manage, on a
property-by-property basis, every type of land use that might be
proposed. While much of this enabling legislation reserves state control
over selected environmental matters, or creates spheres of state-local
concurrent jurisdiction, the overall result is to further empower local
governments to consider the environment in land use decision making.26
When considering the myriad land use decisions that affect the
environment of each community -decisions that often do not fall under
the purview of state or federal environmental review27 -the significance
of this local authority cannot be overstated. As one scholar has observed,
"[1]and use change is arguably the most pervasive socio-economic force
driving changes and degradation of ecosystems."' A U.S. Department of
Agriculture study concluded that between 1982 and 2003, developed land
in the United States increased by 48 percent or 35 million acres. 29 This
conversion of land creates air and water pollution, increased erosion and
runoff, habitat and wetland loss, diminished water supply, and other
23. See Flowers v. Northampton Bucks Cnty. Mun. Auth., 57 Pa. D. & C.2d 274, 279, 283-
84 (C.P. Bucks Cnty. Pa. 1972) (citing other cases therein).
24. See Kepo'o v. Watson, 952 P.2d 379, 387 (Haw. 1998); City of Springfield v. Hashman,
774 N.E.2d 427, 433 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002); Vill. of Glencoe v. Metro. Sanitary Dist., 320 N.E.2d
524, 527 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974).
25. For examples, see generally John R. Nolon, Historical Overview of the American Land
Use System: A Diagnostic Approach to Evaluating Governmental Land Use Control, 23 PACE
ENVTL. LAW REV. 821 [hereinafter Historical Overview]; Nolon, In Praise of Parochialism, supra
note 2, at 386-413.
26. Admittedly, there are variations among states concerning whether the courts will
liberally or narrowly construe implied authority. These variations have resulted in differing
amounts of local government authority to regulate the environment. Nonetheless, the overall
trend is one toward broader implied authority. Nolon, In Praise of Parochialism, supra note 2, at
385-86.
27. See generally Nolon, Historical Overview, supra note 27, for areas of state and federal
preemption, as well as the large remainder of local government authority. Generally, federal
areas of regulation include selected toxic substances, wetlands, endangered species, and
discharges into air and water. Within these areas many regulatory exemptions exist. State areas
of regulation vary by state, but states often assist the federal government and also commonly
review facilities siting and sanitation matters.
28. JunJie Wu, Land Use Changes: Economic, Social, and Environmental Impacts,
CHOICES, 4th Quarter 2008, at 8 tbl.2.
29. See id. at 10 fig.1 (citing National Resources Inventory of the Natural Resources
Conservation Service, USDA).
8 [ 38:1
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harms.' In the absence of local government action, communities may
face these environmental dangers without adequate protection. In other
words, the risk of creating an unhealthful environment would be high.
Our inability to rely solely on state and federal laws is perhaps best
demonstrated by the many types of local environmental regulations in
place nationwide today. As land use scholar John R. Nolon has observed,
"[t]he gradual evolution toward environmental sensitivity in local land
use controls has proceeded far enough that a distinct environmental ethic,
as opposed to an incidental one, is evident."" To illustrate, Nolon points
to a "host of environmental regulations" that protect sensitive
environmental areas such as floodplains, wildlife habitats, groundwater
and aquifers, ridgelines and steep slopes, scenic vistas, streams and
watercourses, and wetlands.32 Regulations also control specific actions
affecting the environment, such as erosion and sediment runoff, solid
waste disposal, storm water management, timber harvesting, and
vegetation removal.33 Importantly, many of these regulations address
nonpoint source pollution, "an urgent problem that generally is conceded
to be beyond the reach of federal environmental law."'
, Thus, at this time of heightened local focus on the environment, local
governments in the environmental rights states are strongly positioned to
assert their authority to undertake environmental regulation. And more
importantly, they are unique among local governments in having a
concomitant duty to undertake that regulation in a way that protects
environmental rights.
2. A Constitutional Duty
Despite this emerging local environmental ethic, in states with
environmental rights there remains a surprising disconnect between local
regulatory authority and local government action to protect the
constitutional right to a healthful environment. Perhaps this inaction is
attributable to the view that responsibility for environmental protection
resides with state agencies, to the perception that local government
enabling authority fails to provide sufficient direction, or to the practical
difficulties that leave local governments uncertain of where to begin.
30. See Elizabeth P. Marshall & James S. Shortle, Urban Development Impacts on
Ecosystems, in LAND USE PROBLEMS AND CONFLIcES: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND
SOLUTIONS 81-90 (Stephan J. Goetz et al. eds., 2005); Wu, supra note 28, at 10; M.G. Chapman
& A.J. Underwood, Comparative Effects of Urbanisation in Marine and Terrestrial Habitats, in
ECOLOGY OF CITIES AND TOWNS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 57-68 (Mark J. McDonnell et
al. eds., 2009).
31. Nolon, In Praise of Parochialism, supra note 2, at 376-77 (footnote citations omitted).
32. See id. at 376-77.
33. See id. at 377.
34. Id.
9
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Whatever the reasons for inaction, none obviate the legal reality that
these local governments have an obligation to plan, zone, and review
subdivisions with environmental rights in mind. For it is a well-accepted
principle that all levels of government must discharge their functions in
keeping with constitutional mandates and may not "disregard ... cardinal
constitutional guarantees.""
A review of the case law confirms that some local governments do
incorrectly perceive that state agencies bear sole responsibility for
addressing environmental rights. For example, in Community College of
Delaware County v. Fox, a Pennsylvania court observed that although
that state's environmental rights provision "does not specify what
governmental agency or agencies may be responsible for its
implementation .. . it seems clear that many state and local governmental
agencies doubtless share this responsibility."36 There, the litigants
assumed that the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources
(PDER) was solely responsible for safeguarding environmental rights
when permitting a major sewer line extension." The court disagreed,
concluding that Delaware County shared that responsibility. Because the
county possessed delegated land use powers, it was responsible for
analyzing the secondary environmental effects posed by the land
development that would inevitably accompany the sewer line extension.
Tellingly, the court concluded:
These municipal agencies have the responsibility to apply the
[constitutional] mandate as they fulfill their respective roles in the
planning and regulation of land use, and they, of course, are not only
agents of the Commonwealth, too, but trustees of the public natural
resources as well, just as certainly as is the [PDER]. 39
Along similar lines, the transcripts for the 1970 Illinois
Constitutional Convention specify that all levels of government should
play a role in ensuring a healthful environment, and the delegates called
for the state legislature to implement environmental rights through a
regulatory system where "the inter and intra governmental efforts
35. E.g., 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 60 (2d ed. 2010). Even in states with lesser
environmental policy provisions in their constitutions, commentators have concluded that those
policy statements necessarily imbue the decision making of government officials who must factor
public interest and public policy into their decisions. See, e.g., A. E. Dick Howard, State
Constitutions and the Environment, 58 VA. L. REV. 193, 209 (1972) ("It is implicit in the
character of public agencies that they are to act in the public interest and, in particular, that their
acts are to be compatible with public policy as ordained by the Constitution.").
36. Cmty. Coll. of Delaware Cnty. v. Fox, 342 A.2d 468, 481 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975).
37. See id. at 481-82.
38. See id.
39. Id. at 482; see also Franklin Twp. v. Commonwealth, 452 A.2d 718, 721-22 (Pa. 1982)
(plurality opinion) (observing that local governments have a "constitutional charge" to protect
and enhance the quality of the environment for its citizens).
10 [38:1
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complement one another ... [through] a coordinated plan of action with
uniform standards."4 Nonetheless, in City of Chicago v. Pollution Control
Board, the City of Chicago argued that, because it had home-rule powers,
its municipal disposal sites and incinerators were not bound by state
environmental regulations.41 In rejecting the City's arguments, the Illinois
Supreme Court turned to the environmental provisions in the state's
constitution and concluded that Chicago was not insulated from those
provisions.42 While Chicago could legislate concurrently with the state, it
could not apply lesser standards that harm the environment.4 3 Under
Chicago's argument, "it would be difficult if not impossible for the
General Assembly to perform the mandate of maintaining a healthful
environment imposed upon it by article XI of the 1970 Constitution.""
Implicit in the court's analysis was the recognition that local governments
like Chicago must exercise their authority in a way that safeguards, rather
than undermines, environmental rights.
The Hawaii Supreme Court has also clarified that a constitutional
duty to protect and promote state environmental resources applies to
"the State and its political subdivisions."45 In Kelly v. 1250 Oceanside
Partners, the County of Hawaii argued that it had no constitutional duty
to protect coastal waters from runoff pollution caused by a subdivision
development within its jurisdiction because those waters belonged to the
state.46 The Hawaii Department of Health (HDOH) had primary
permitting authority over storm water discharge associated with
construction activity along Kealakekua Bay, which is classified among
Hawaii's most natural, pristine waters. Despite HDOH's permitting
authority, the county also had state-delegated police powers over grading
and grubbing activities to control soil erosion and sediment.47 The
supreme court concluded that both the state and the county had
constitutional obligations to protect the environment and that the statutes
outlining the county's responsibilities "would be rendered meaningless if
the County were excused from [its regulatory] obligation.""
40. REPORT OF THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT COMMITTEE ON A PROPOSED
ENVIRONMENT ARTICLE, 6 COMMITTEE PROPOSALS 697, 700 (1970) [hereinafter COMMITTEE
PROPOSALS]. At the same time, the delegates were cognizant of the reality that legislation alone
would not suffice, and that a constitutional right was needed as well. See Verbatim Transcript of
July 22, 1970, 4 SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 2991 [hereinafter ILLINOIS
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION]; Leahy, infra note 97, at 3-4.
41. City of Chicago v. Pollution Control Bd., 322 N.E.2d 11, 13 (Ill. 1975).
42. See id. at 14-15.
43. See id.
44. Id.
45. Kelly v. 1250 Oceanside Partners, 140 P.3d 985, 1003 (Haw. 2006) (emphasis added)
(addressing the water resources provision in HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 1).
46. See id.
47. See id. at 990, 1004.
4& Id. at 1004-08.
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And in Montana, a recent case illustrates the lingering misperception
about the local government's role in protecting environmental rights.
There, a county board of adjustment was recently sued for violations of
the right to a clean and healthful environment when it authorized a gravel
pit in a residential area.49 Even though counties have concurrent
jurisdiction with the state when permitting gravel pits in such areas, the
board argued that "the Legislature charged the [Montana Department of
Environmental Quality], not the counties, with protecting the right to a
clean and healthful environment."so While the Montana Supreme Court
did not reach this broad argument on appeal, its presence provides a
startling reminder of the environmental rights work that remains to be
done at the local government level. The board's argument is all the more
startling when one considers that the Montana Supreme Court has
already enforced environmental rights not only against government
entities but against private parties as well."
It is time for local governments in the environmental rights states to
squarely recognize their responsibility for protecting those rights in land
use decision making-and none too soon.
With land use development continuing to increase,52 the
environmental issues facing local governments promise only to increase
in quantity and complexity. As the Hawaii Supreme Court observed in
the context of water resources:
As competition for water resources increases, the analysis of both the
public interest and of reasonableness must become both more
rigorous and affirmative. The counties will be required to articulate
their land use priorities with greater specificity. For example, even at
the present time, there is more land zoned for various uses than
available water to supply those proposed uses. Thus, it is not
sufficient to merely conclude that a particular parcel of land is
properly zoned ....
49. See Flathead Citizens for Quality Growth, Inc. v. Flathead Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment,
2008 MT 1, 341 Mont. 1, 175 P.3d 282.
50. Id. at 290.
51. See Cape-France Enters. v. Estate of Lola H. Peed, 2001 MT 139, 205 Mont. 513, 29
P.3d 1011, 1017. In Cape-France, a private buyer sued a private seller to rescind a contract for
the purchase of land after learning of groundwater pollution beneath the property. The buyer,
who planned to subdivide the property, would have been required by state subdivision laws to
drill a test well that likely would have caused the spread of a contaminated plume and
endangered the public health. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court held, inter alia, that to
require specific performance of the contract would be to require the landowner to violate the
state's fundamental constitutional right to a clean and healthful environment. The contract was
thus voided. See id
52. See Wu, supra notes 28-29.
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. . . That minimal conclusion may be inadequate to resolve situations
in which competitive demand exceeds supply. Further analysis ... will
be needed."
An increase in development also promises an increased possibility of
litigation over the environmental harms associated with land
development. Lawsuits may come from private landowners, from interest
groups, or from other state agencies or local governments whose interests
and responsibilities touch upon the environment. In the absence of
proactive environmental regulation, local governments will continue to
be vulnerable to lawsuits alleging violations of the right to a healthful
environment.54
A pattern of complacency or inadequate review may also result in
the loss of local government authority if the state or federal government
determines that protection is better achieved through state or federal
control." Meaningful environmental protection requires a unified
federal-state-local approach; thus it is important that local government
remain a credible partner because of the uniquely local perspective and
knowledge it brings to the table. For all of these reasons, local
governments in Illinois, Pennsylvania, Montana, and Hawaii should
proceed to uphold their state's constitution and implement
environmental rights -regardless of whether their states have provided
clear legislative guidance.
3. A Duty that Exists Despite a Lack of Statutory Guidance
As a general rule, local government land use powers are bounded by
the terms of authority delegated from the parent state.5 6 Thus, state
53. In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiahole), 9 P.3d 409,427 (Haw. 2000).
54. When local governments are not proactive, they also leave more environmental
decisions in the hands of the judiciary, which can be ill-equipped to handle scientifically
complex, nuanced community issues. Brooks, supra note 3, at 1096, 1110 ("The design for such
[environmental] compensation or restoration is best achieved at the local level.").
55. For a classic argument that states should "pull back" local control, see Eric Pearson &
Gerald J. Hutton, Land Use in Pennsylvania: Any Change Since the Environmental Rights
Amendment?, 14 DUQ. L. REv. 165, 201 (1975-76). For past examples of federal and state
intervention on behalf of the environment, see Nolon, Historical Overview, supra note 25, at
834-42 (observing how past environmental harms "left unabated by the land use control system
driven by local governments" resulted in state and federal intervention over some environmental
matters). See generally Michael F. Reilly, Transformation at Work: The Effect of Environmental
Law on Land Use Control, 24 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 33 (1989) (summarizing the history of
federal and state incursions into local government environmental authority).
56. The source of the powers could come from a statute, constitution, charter, or some
combination of these sources, depending on the form of local government involved. The
numerous variations in local government forms, including those with home rule versus delegated
powers, are addressed generally in 1 PATRICIA E. SALKIN, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING ch. 2
(5th ed. 2010).
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delegating statutes" serve as the guideposts by which local governments
must address environmental rights." These statutes provide guidance
ranging from the specific to the general. And in some cases the
environment is not mentioned at all, leaving only the existence of implied
authority under the police powers." Regardless of the degree of
specificity, local governments carry a constitutional obligation to protect
environmental rights.
In limited instances, legislatures in the environmental rights states
have provided local governments with specific guidance regarding how to
address environmental harm. For example, under the Hawaii Coastal
Zone Management Act," counties are allowed to permit development in
state-designated coastal zones only if the proposed developments either
"will not have any substantial environmental or ecological effect" or the
adverse effect is minimized and "clearly outweighed by public health,
safety, or compelling public interests."6 1 For their part, Montana local
governments must request an environmental assessment (EA) for certain
categories of subdivisions and apply subdivision review criteria involving
impacts to wildlife, wildlife habitat, the natural environment, and public
health and safety.62 And Illinois requires concurrent state-local approval
of pollution control facilities, giving local governments a series of criteria
to apply in their review process.63
Yet even with this statutory guidance, much uncertainty remains.
Local governments must still decipher what the statutory criteria mean,
what evidence is relevant under the criteria, and how to weigh that
evidence. Additionally, there is no guarantee that statutory compliance
equals constitutional compliance. A state legislature may provide a
statutory baseline that falls short of- or even runs counter to - protecting
a healthful environment in a given land use scenario. Take for example
the Montana rule requiring proof of adequate water supply in advance of
57. Salkin notes that the forms "resist easy generalization," but that regardless of the form
of government, statutes play a key role in shaping how land use authority is exercised because all
states have adopted specific zoning enabling legislation. Id. §§ 2.4, 2.6, 6.28; see also 1 EDWARD
H. ZIEGLER, JR., RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 1.8 (4th ed. 2010)
(concluding that regardless of the source of authority, "a local ordinance may be held invalid if
found to be inconsistent with, and thus preempted by, state law"). This Article focuses
principally on enabling statutes as sources of authority, but similar observations can be extended
to authority derived from a charter or constitution.
58. Unless the local government elects to challenge the legality of the statute or seeks
legislative amendment of the statute. See discussion infra Part I.B.
59. See discussion supra Part I.A.1.
60. HAW. REv. STAT. § 205A (West 2010).
61. HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 205A-4, -26 (West 2010). When a county fails to follow the
statutory guidelines, its development permits can be reversed by a court. See Mahuiki v. Kauai
Planning Comm'n, 654 P.2d 874, 882-83 (Haw. 1982).
62. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 76-3-504(1)(b), -603, -608 (2009).
63. See 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 39.2 and 5 / 3.330 (West 2010).
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subdivision approval.' For one subdivision developer in Bozeman,
Montana, adhering to this rule would have meant drilling test wells that
could have spread a major contamination plume believed to be located
beneath the subject property, making compliance constitutionally
unlawful.65
In countless other instances the statutes are largely silent, leaving
local governments to fall back on their implied authority and exercise
best judgment. For example, Illinois subdivision and zoning statutes do
not mention the environment.' Likewise, Pennsylvania's subdivision
statutes do not mention the environment,6' and its zoning statutes only
generally require that local government zoning preserve and provide for
the protection of the natural environment and its resources.6 More
general still, Montana zoning must simply "promote public health, public
safety, and general welfare" and "encourag[e] the most appropriate use
of land throughout the jurisdictional area."'
In the face of such oblique guidance or statutory silence, local
governments may erroneously conclude that they need not consider, or
need only minimally consider, environmental rights when regulating land
use. But a legislature's failure to explicitly require something is no reason
to ignore a constitutional mandate.70 Lamenting the lack of state laws
addressing environmental rights, scholars have urged public servants to
"consider seriously whether their failure to take into account in decision
making all environmental factors will infringe on citizens' rights to a clean
and healthful environment."7 1 Indeed, "[n]o function of government can
be discharged in disregard of or in opposition to the fundamental law.
The state constitution is the mandate of sovereign people to its servants
and representatives. No one of them has a right to disregard its
64. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-3-504(1)(g)(iii) (2009). For subdivisions not connecting to
municipal water supply, on-site wells are the typical means of supply.
65. See Cape-France Enters. v. Estate of Lola H. Peed, 2001 MT 139, 305 Mont. 513, 29
P.3d 1011, 1013, 1017. Discussed supra note 51 and accompanying text.
66. The zoning statutes include 55 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 5-12001 (counties); 60 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 1 / 110-10 (West 2010) (townships); 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 11-13-1
(West 2010) (municipalities). The subdivision statutes are dispersed but include 55 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5 / 5-1041 (West 2010) (counties); 60 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1 / 105-35(b)(1) (West
2010) (townships); 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 11-12-5 to -8 (West 2010) (municipalities).
67. See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 10503 (2010).
68. See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 10603-10604 (2010).
69. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 76-2-203, -304 (2009).
70. John L. Horwich makes this same observation in the context of judicial guidance in his
article Montana's Constitutional Environmental Quality Provisions: Self-Execution or Self-
Delusion?, 57 MONT. L. REV. 323, 347-50 (1996) (citing Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The
Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1213-36 (1978)).
71. Carl W. Tobias & Daniel N. McLean, Of Crabbed Interpretations and Frustrated
Mandates: The Effect of Environmental Policy Acts on Pre-Existing Agency Authority, 41 MONT.
L. REV. 177, 257 (1980) (citing Richard J. Tobin, Some Observations on the Use of State
Constitutions to Protect the Environment, 3 ENVTL. AFF. 473, 475 (1974)).
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mandates . . . ."72 Thus, local governments must walk a careful line,
ensuring that they operate within their statutory authority while using the
full extent of that authority-both express and implied-to ensure
constitutional mandates are honored.
B. Local Governments Should Seek Judicial Intervention When
Environmental Harm May Occur
While statutes are the guideposts by which local governments
address environmental rights, ultimately the judiciary is the guardian and
arbiter of those constitutional rights. Not surprisingly, some local
governments have moved beyond land use regulations by taking
environmental issues to the courts. Some have filed legal proceedings on
behalf of their constituents to enjoin other jurisdictions or agencies from
permitting a land use that may cause environmental harm in the
community. Others have affirmatively challenged state statutes as
unconstitutional for failing to protect against environmental harm. While
the case law remains unsettled regarding whether local governments are
obligated to pursue these legal avenues, it is important to note this trend
toward litigation and its complementary role in addressing environmental
harms within a local jurisdiction.
The most common litigation example is when a local government
sues another agency or jurisdiction to reverse a decision posing a risk to
the local government's environment. For example, in Franklin Township
v. Commonwealth, a Pennsylvania county and township sued the PDER
for permitting a toxic waste landfill in their jurisdictions." The PDER
questioned whether the local governments had standing to sue over a
state regulatory matter." The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, citing the
state's environmental rights clause, concluded that a strong case for
standing existed:
[A] township and a county are more than abstract entities; each is also
a place populated by people. They can be identified by fixed and
definable political and geographic boundaries. These boundaries
72. Gen. Agric. Corp. v. Moore, 534 P.2d 859, 862-63 (Mont. 1975) (citing 16 AM. JUR. 2D
Constitutional Law § 56) (discussing the constitutional mandate that existing water rights be
protected).
73. Franklin Twp. v. Commonwealth, 452 A.2d 718 (Pa. 1982) (plurality opinion); see, e.g.,
Waiahole, 9 P.3d 409 (Haw. 2000) (communities suing to prevent state water rights decision that
affected instream flow, habitat, and community water supply); Vill. of Hillside v. John Sexton
Sand & Gravel Corp., 434 N.E.2d 382 (1. App. Ct. 1982) (village and county suing to prevent
the state from permitting a solid waste landfill within the corporate limits of the landfill). A
related example would be suing for existing environmental damages. Town of Superior v.
ASARCO Inc., No. 04-668 (Mont. Sup. Ct. filed Feb. 4, 2005) (local governments and school
district suing for damages caused by mining contamination despite extant cleanup efforts under
federal and state regulations).
74. See Franklin Twp., 452 A.2d at 720.
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encompass a certain natural existence-land, water, air, etc.
collectively referred to as environment. Whatever affects the natural
environment within the borders of a township or county affects the
very township or county itself. Toxic wastes which are deposited in
the land irrevocably alter the fundamental nature of the land which in
turn irrevocably alter the physical nature of the municipality and
county of which the land is a part. It is clear that when land is
changed, a serious risk of change to all other components of the
environment arises. Such changes and threat of changes ostensibly
conflict with the obligations townships and counties have to nature
and the quality of life. We believe that the interest of local
government in protecting the environment, which is part of its
physical existence, is "substantial" . . . . Aesthetic and environmental
well-being are important aspects of the quality of life in our society,
and a key role of local government is to promote and protect life's
quality for all of its inhabitants."
Whereas many local governments look to emergency regulations as a
stop-gap to addressing perceived deficiencies in state agency
environmental review," Franklin Township illustrates how litigation can
be a supplementary strategy for addressing local environmental
concerns.77
Local government may also challenge the constitutionality of a land
use statute. A statute governing local govermnent, either by its plain
language or as applied, may not result in a constitutionally acceptable
outcome for the environment. To assume that following a statute equates
with constitutional compliance is to overlook the reality that a legislature
can effectively nullify a constitutional right." Local governments may
75. Id. (footnotes and internal citations omitted).
76. See generally, e.g., Vill. of DePue v. Viacom Int'l, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d 854 (C.D. Ill.
2009) (documenting village's unsuccessful attempts to adopt local regulations compelling
cleanup at a contaminated smelter site because village was dissatisfied with pace of cleanup
progress under state law); Liberty Cove, Inc. v. Missoula Cnty., 2009 MT 377, 353 Mont. 286, 220
P.3d 617 (where county adopted emergency ordinance banning gravel pit due to concerns about
inadequate review by two state agencies).
77. In some instances the recovery of attorney fees may also be possible, making this type
of litigation a more viable option for local governments with limited financial resources. In
Pennsylvania, for example, at least one statute awards attorney fees to prevailing local
governments in a dispute with a state agency. See 35 PENN. STAT. ANN. § 691.307(b) (West
2010); Solebury Twp. v. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 928 A.2d 990 (Pa. 2007) (awarding attorney fees to
township which challenged proposed issuance of water quality certificate in connection with
development project, and holding that the state's strong policy to justly compensate parties who
challenge agency actions requires that the fee-shifting provision in the Clean Streams Act be
liberally interpreted).
78. See McLaren, supra note 3, at 135, 139, 149 (discussing the risks of deferring to statutes
alone). It also overlooks, as Brooks has aptly observed, the reality that the "system of
regulations may fail for myriad reasons: agency capture, bureaucratic mismanagement,
inappropriate standardization, unreliable information, distortions from litigation or threat of
litigation, costs of administration, incorrect standards and their mistaken application,
17
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thus confront the dilemma of being seemingly forced to apply state land
use law in a situation where such application violates state constitutional
environmental rights.
Although case law in this area is undeveloped, at least one
concurring opinion has suggested that local governments in this situation
have an affirmative obligation to seek judicial invalidation of the
offending statute. In Merlin Myers Revocable Trust v. Yellowstone
County," a county commission in Montana denied a proposed gravel pit
on land zoned as agricultural because of the environmental risk to a
nearby school and some residential properties. Access to the gravel pit
was by easement through the school property.' Under Montana's zoning
enabling statutes, counties are precluded from denying gravel pits in non-
residential zones." Rather than following the gravel pit statute, the
county commission denied the permit because the mine would violate the
Montana Constitution's right to a clean and healthful environment by
placing school children and other nearby residents at risk.82 The Montana
Supreme Court invalidated the county's decision, concluding that the
county was obligated to follow state law and that it violated the
separation-of-powers doctrine when it found the gravel mining statute
unconstitutional." While the court had exclusive authority to decide the
statute's constitutionality, it avoided the question and noted that the
county could ameliorate environmental harms by imposing mitigating
conditions on the gravel operation.'
Responding to the constitutional question, the specially concurring
opinion of Justice Nelson set the stage for future challenges to land use
statutes:
I do not concede that, statute or no statute, a governmental entity can
act in a fashion so as to permit or require infringement of the
environmental interests protected under . . . the Constitution of
Montana. If, indeed, the neighborhood school students' fundamental
rights to a clean and healthful environment were put at risk because
of the operation of [a state statute] . . . then the Board should have
brought its constitutional challenge in the District Court at the
outset.8
'discrimination' against new facilities, political intervention, economic corruption, and lack of
legitimacy." Brooks, supra note 3, at 1063, 1065 & n.14.
79. Merlin Myers Revocable Trust v. Yellowstone Cnty., 2002 MT 201, 311 Mont. 194, 53
P.3d 1268.
80. See id. at 1269-70.
81. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-2-209(3) (2009). The case involved an earlier version of
this statute: MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-2-209 (2001).
82. See Merlin Myers Revocable Trust, 53 P.3d at 1272.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. Id. at 1273 (Nelson, J., specially concurring) (internal citations omitted).
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Under Justice Nelson's analysis, it is incumbent on local government to
seek judicial invalidation of a state statute when its application would
result in the violation of environmental rights. Stated another way, local
government cannot hide behind a state statute and permit an
environmental rights violation to occur. This logic mirrors that of the
court's previous holding in Cape-France Enterprises v. Estate of Lola H.
Peed, which released a private party from fulfilling its legal obligations
when doing so may have caused significant environmental harm.' In
essence, these rulings point to declaratory judgment actions as a vehicle
to fulfill constitutional duties when enabling statutes fall short.
Consistent with Justice Nelson's analysis, the jurisprudence of the
other environmental rights states suggests that local governments may
not rigidly follow statutory mandates that violate environmental rights. It
is "well accepted in [Illinois] that the constitution is not regarded as a
grant of powers to the legislature but is a limitation upon its authority.""
Indeed, the delegates to the Illinois Constitutional Convention
specifically noted the public's distrust of the state legislature's ability to
protect the environment through statutes alone, thus clearly indicating an
intent that any state statute would yield to the constitutional right.' The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has observed that local governments have a
"constitutional charge" to protect environmental quality and that they
should address environmental matters "without delay," even when state-
level agencies have approved the land use activity creating the
environmental harm." And while the Pennsylvania courts have held that
local governments are not required to adopt special legislation to
specifically implement environmental rights,' they must-in order to pass
''constitutional muster"-factor environmental rights into their decision
making under existing statutes and local ordinances.91 The Hawaii courts
have likewise reminded governments that their statutory powers are
circumscribed by constitutionally protected rights.' This jurisprudence all
points to the conclusion that local governments cannot mechanically
follow statutory mandates if in doing so they are violating a known
86. Cape-France Enters. v. Estate of Lola H. Peed, 2001 MT 139, 305 Mont. 513, 29 P.3d
1011, 1017. Discussed supra notes 51 and 65 and accompanying text.
87. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. State Bd. of Elections, 558 N.E.2d 89, 94 (Ill. 1990)
(concerning a statute abrogating constitutional provisions regarding the structure of the
judiciary).
88. See discussion infra Part II.A.
89. See Franklin Twp. v. Commonwealth, 452 A.2d 718, 722-23 (Pa. 1982) (plurality
opinion) (responding to state agency contention that local government lacked standing to sue).
90. See Blue Mountain Pres. Ass'n. v. Township of Eldred, 867 A.2d 692, 702-04 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2005). This ruling is based on the fact that zoning is optional in Pennsylvania. Id.
91. Id.
92. See e.g., Kelly v. 1250 Oceanside Partners, 140 P.3d 985, 1010 (Haw. 2006) ("Although
in some respect, exercise of [the Department of Health]'s authority is discretionary in nature,
such discretionary authority is circumscribed by the public trust doctrine.").
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constitutional right. That path leads to potential environmental damage
and litigation exposure. Instead, the wiser path is to bring a problematic
statute to the court for a determination of the statute's constitutionality."
Relying on a combination of statutory and judicial guidance will take
local governments a certain distance in meeting their constitutional
obligations. The rest of the distance must be crossed by using best efforts
and educated predictions about environmental rights in each state. Part
III assists local governments in this practical planning process. But before
proceeding there, Part II provides some context by briefly summarizing
the environmental rights and land use regimes in the environmental
rights states.
II. A LAND USE LENS: STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
RECOGNIZING A RIGHT TO A HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT
Since their emergence in state constitutions during the 1970s,
environmental rights clauses have been examined through a variety of
lenses. Among other topics, scholars have inquired into the scope of the
rights, the extent to which the rights are self-executing, whether parties
have standing to sue, and against whom the rights can be enforced.94
Providing a slightly different lens, this Part focuses on how environmental
rights should inform land use regulation in Illinois, Pennsylvania,
Montana, and Hawaii." Each state's unique constitutional language is set
forth, followed by an analysis of how environmental rights intersect with
land use laws in that jurisdiction. By viewing the states alongside one
another, practitioners can observe common trends and better appreciate
features that may be distinct to their particular state. Ultimately,
practitioners can then begin to find their way towards environmental
regulatory design.
A. Illinois Constitution
Article XI (Environment), Sections 1 and 2:
93. Admittedly, the occasional need to challenge offending statutes in court will present
litigation costs for the local government. On the other hand, the government would likely face
comparable or even greater costs defending litigation alleging that it violated environmental
rights by enforcing a statute that is unconstitutional.
94. For a sampling of such articles, see supra note 3. This article does not directly enter into
the debate of whether the environmental rights provisions are self-executing, observing instead
that the courts in each state have as a practical matter already applied the provisions to local
government land use questions. See discussion supra Part I.A.2.
95. While the states rely in part on state environmental agencies to implement
environmental rights, the discussion in this Part is largely focused on local government spheres
of authority.
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The public policy of the State and the duty of each person is to
provide and maintain a healthful environment for the benefit of this
and future generations.
The General Assembly shall provide by law for the implementation
and enforcement of this public policy.
Each person has the right to a healthful environment. Each person
may enforce this right against any party, governmental or private,
through appropriate legal proceedings subject to reasonable
limitation and regulation as the General Assembly may provide by
law.
In 1970 Illinois became the first state to adopt an environmental
right in its constitution. The constitutional convention transcripts reveal
that the right is intended to be a fundamental one -an "extension of the
right to life" -with a focus on protecting human health.' Delegates to the
1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention expressed a reluctance to rely
exclusively on the Illinois Environmental Protection Act (IEPA), then
recently enacted, because the rights mentioned in that Act "could be
abolished by future amendment to the Act" and because there was "no
actual assurance that this Act would result in strong State action against
pollution."' Thus, Illinois citizens took the additional step of placing an
environmental right in the Illinois Constitution.98
The Illinois courts have issued several strong decisions protecting
that state's environmental rights. For example, when environmental and
property interests have come head-to-head, the courts have held that
property interests-even constitutionally protected ones - are
subordinate." The courts have also held that local governments have a
96. See ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 40, at 2991, 2998 (including
both physical and noise pollution); COMMITTEE PROPOSALS, supra note 40, at 697, 700.
97. Mary Lee Leahy, Individual Legal Remedies against Pollution in Illinois, 3 LOY. U. CHI.
L. 1, 14 (1972). Leahy was a delegate to the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention. Id. at 1.
Leahy further observed that the Act, which is couched solely in terms of pollution, is narrower
than the range of activities that might affect human health as contemplated in the Illinois
Constitution. Id. at 14.
98. See id. at 14; see also ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 40, at 2996,
3003, 3006 (noting right of persons to seek judicial invalidation of statutes that violate the
environmental right).
99. See e.g., Cobin v. Pollution Control Bd., 307 N.E.2d 191, 193, 199 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974)
(affirming cease and desist order against salvage company engaged in open burning of
automobiles); A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. EPA, 290 N.E.2d 892, 896 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972) (affirming
requirement that a manufacturer pay to treat contaminants discharged from private sewer
system before they reached a municipal sewage treatment plant and were discharged into state
waters). Regulatory priority is separate from the question of whether a regulation constitutes a
taking that requires just compensation.
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duty to implement environmental rights.'" Finally, the doctrine of
estoppel cannot be used to foreclose environmental rights claims."0'
Regarding the scope of article XI, the Illinois Supreme Court has
narrowly drawn "healthful environment" to encompass direct effects on
human health, excluding other types of harms such as harm to animal
species or habitats." While Illinois' definition is the narrowest of the four
environmental rights states, the Court's approach is directly supported by
the convention records.o3
On the other hand, some Illinois court rulings appear to contradict
the intent of article XI. The first is a ruling that Illinois' environmental
right is not fundamental. In Illinois Pure Water Committee, Inc. v.
Director of Public Health, a litigant argued that the right was
fundamental, but apparently provided no legal authority to support the
argument.'" The court concluded the litigant had not carried its burden
and, presuming the right was not fundamental, applied rational basis
review to the government's action." Although the Illinois courts have
relied heavily on the convention transcripts when construing article XI, in
this case the court unknowingly contradicted clear statements in those
transcripts.' 6 Had the court classified the right as fundamental, as
Montana has classified its right," the court likely would have applied a
heightened degree of scrutiny. Paradoxically, in a subsequent case the
court noted in passing that the constitutional record does characterize the
right as fundamental." Future litigants are thus in a position to renew the
fundamental right argument and seek correction of the court's erroneous
conclusion in Illinois Pure Water.
The second questionable Illinois ruling narrowed a litigant's ability
to preemptively stop environmental harm. A statutory provision in the
IEPA prevents citizens or affected local governments from challenging
agency permits for activities regulated under the Act.'" On multiple
100. See City of Chicago v. Pollution Control Bd., 322 N.E.2d 11, 14-15 (Ill. 1975).
Discussed supra Part I.A.
101. See Tri-Cnty. Landfill Co. v. Ill. Pollution Control Bd., 353 N.E.2d 316, 322 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1976).
102. See Glisson v. City of Marion, 720 N.E.2d 1034, 1042-45 (Ill. 1999) (concluding plaintiff
lacked standing under article XI where a proposed dam and reservoir would harm two
threatened and endangered species); see also Scattering Fork Drainage Dist. v. Ogilvie, 311
N.E.2d 203, 210 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (finding no connection between harm to a person's ability to
hunt and fish and the right to a healthful environment). But see infra Part III.B.1 (noting
Pennsylvania's finding that wildlife harms are related to human harms).
103. See sources cited supra note 96.
104. Ill. Pure Water Comm., Inc., v. Dir. of Pub. Health, 470 N.E.2d 988, 992 (Ill. 1984).
105. See id.
106. See sources cited supra note 96.
107. See discussion supra Part I.B.
108. Glisson v. City of Marion, 720 N.E.2d 1034, 1042 (Ill. 1999).
109. See 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 40(a)(1) (West 2010). The only exception appears to
be for hazardous waste facilities, where local governments, but not individual citizens, are
22 [ 38: 1
HeinOnline  -- 38 Ecology L.Q. 22 2011
2011] CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO HEALTHFUL ENVIRONMENT
occasions the Illinois Supreme Court has upheld the statute and
concluded there is no cause of action unless the permitted operation later
causes or threatens to cause pollution.' This delayed ability to raise
environmental rights claims contradicts other holdings by the Illinois
courts recognizing that even a likelihood of pollution can be the basis for
enforcing environmental rights because some pollution is irreversible and
some risks are simply too great."' The Act's foreclosure of claims also
constitutes a legislative curtailing of a constitutional right, which the
convention delegates clearly did not intend.'12
Turning to Illinois' land use statutes, Illinois local governments enjoy
broadly delegated powers to plan, zone, and regulate the subdivision of
land, although the enabling statutes make no mention of environmental
rights."3 And there are some notable gaps, such as the narrow definition
of subdivision, which captures only those divisions of land creating lots
less than five acres in size," 4 and the prohibition against county regulation
of utilities."' Unlike in Montana, however, Illinois counties are allowed
to regulate sand and gravel extraction activities."'
Outside of the general land use statutes, there are a handful of more
specific local government provisions related to the environment. Unique
among the four states, Illinois cities and villages have broad
extraterritorial powers to "prevent or punish any pollution or injury" to
waters that may serve as their water supply.117 Local governments also
have concurrent jurisdiction with the state over several permitting
matters under the IEPA, including the siting of waste disposal facilities."'
allowed to challenge a permit decision. See 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 39.3, 40(b) (West
2010).
110. See City of Elgin v. Cnty. of Cook, 660 N.E.2d 875, 880, 884 (Ill. 1995); White Fence
Farm, Inc. v. Land & Lakes Co., 424 N.E.2d 1370, 1376-77 (Ill. 1981).
111. See City of Springfield v. Hashman, 774 N.E.2d 427, 435-46 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002)
(possibility of development's septic system failing and entering water supply); Tri-Cnty. Landfill
Co. v. Ill. Pollution Control Bd., 353 N.E.2d 316, 319-20 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (possibility of one
contaminated aquifer threatening water supply in adjacent aquifer); Vill. of Glencoe v. Metro.
Sanitary Dist., 320 N.E.2d 524, 528 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (possibility that any discharge of waste
into Lake Michigan would be practically irreversible).
112. See sources cited supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
113. See sources cited supra note 66. See also the planning statutes at 55 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5 / 5-14001 (West 2010) (counties); 60 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1 / 105-35 (West 2010)
(townships); 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 11-12-5, -6 (West 2010) (municipalities).
114. See Illinois Plat Act, 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 205 / 1 (West 2010).
115. See 55 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 5-12001 (West 2010).
116. See discussion infra Part II.C.
117. See 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 11-125-2 (West 2010).
118. See 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 39.2, 5 / 3.330 (West 2010); see also Local Solid
Waste Disposal Act, 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10 / 1 to 6 (West 2010); Solid Waste Planning &
Recycling Act, 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 15 / 1 to 2 (West 2010). With certain exceptions, the
Act requires separate local government approvals in addition to state agency permits. The local
government need not conduct a separate environmental review, but it can if it so chooses. See
City of Elgin v. Cnty. of Cook, 660 N.E.2d 875, 881-82 (Ill. 1995).
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Because local governments cannot directly challenge certain agency
permits under the Act, it is particularly important that they take
advantage of these areas of concurrent jurisdiction-the local regulation
may be the only safeguard between a harmful land use activity and the
community." 9 Local governments can also band together and create
Local Land Resource Management Plans under an enabling statute that
includes direct authority to plan for "air and land resources quality,"
"forest lands," "natural resources," and water quality.120 Thus, Illinois
local governments have some ability to supplement their general land use
powers with the more specific powers granted under these environmental
statutes.
B. Pennsylvania Constitution
Article 1 (Declaration of Rights), Section 27:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the
preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the
environment. Pennsylvania's public natural resources are the common
property of all the people, including generations yet to come. As
trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and
maintain them for the benefit of all the people.
In 1971 Pennsylvania followed Illinois in adopting an environmental
rights amendment within its declaration of rights. Article 1, section 27
contains two parts: an environmental rights provision and a separate
public trust statement concerning Pennsylvania's natural resources. The
amendment was intended not only to provide legal recourse to individual
citizens, but to foster a culture where environmental impacts would be
considered before government action occurred.12 1 Shortly after passage of
section 27, the state began construing the section to require agencies "to
act affirmatively beyond statutory requirements to protect the
environment for the present and the future." 22 And the Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Protection, the state's primary
environmental agency, along with several other state agencies,
119. For an example of how this concurrent jurisdiction can favor local government, see
generally Village of Carpentersville v. Pollution Control Board, 553 N.E.2d 362 (Ill. 1990). In that
case, a village height restriction prevented Cargill from installing a 100-foot incinerator discharge
stack for hazardous waste, even though state and federal law would have allowed the discharge
to occur.
120. See 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 805 / 3 to 4 (West 2010).
121. See Howard J. Wein, The Environmental Amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution,
in PENNSYLVANIA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PRACTICE 16-17 (Terry R. Bossert & Joel R.
Burcat eds., 6th ed. 2008). This chapter was previously authored by Franklin L. Kury, who
originated and introduced the environmental rights amendment. Id. at 15.
122. Bertram C. Frey, Pennsylvania's Self-Executing Environmental Amendment: A View of
the Battle of Gettysburg, 9 URB. L. ANN. 245, 256 (1975) (citing Commonwealth v. Fox, Docket
No. 73-078, (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. June 12, 1973)).
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incorporated section 27 into its regulatory permitting processes.123
Commentators at the time anticipated that section 27 would similarly
create a local government duty to affirmatively implement environmental
rights through land use planning and decision making.124 True to these
predictions, the Pennsylvania courts have concluded that local
governments are obligated to address environmental rights in land use
decisions.12
The case law addressing section 27 is extensive and reveals a trend of
strong judicial deference toward development and the agencies rendering
land use decisions. Early on, in Payne v. Kassab, the Commonwealth
Court of Pennsylvania created a three-part test to determine whether the
government has met its trustee duties under the public trust portion of
section 27:
(1) Was there compliance with all applicable statutes and regulations
relevant to the protection of the Commonwealth's public natural
resources?
(2) Does the record demonstrate a reasonable effort to reduce the
environmental incursion to a minimum?
(3) Does the environmental harm which will result from the
challenged decision or action so clearly outweigh the benefits to be
derived therefrom that to proceed further would be an abuse of
discretion?'26
Although the three-part test was expressly designed to apply in the
context of public trust, the courts have extended the same test to the
environmental rights portion of section 27.127 Commentators have
criticized the judiciary's use of the three-part test when determining
environmental rights, asserting that the test can result in unacceptable
levels of environmental harm because it is weighted in favor of property
development or economic benefits." Included within the critique is the
123. For a list of examples, see Wein, supra note 121, at 23-32.
124. See Eric Pearson & Gerald J. Hutton, supra note 55, at 185 (arguing strongly for such a
duty); Frey, supra note 122, at 254-55 (noting the possibility but expressing concern about the
administrative burden of such a duty).
125. See discussion supra Part LA; notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
126. Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 94 (Pa. 1973) (ruling that a street widening that
eliminated portions of a public river common did not violate public trust responsibilities under
section 27). The test apparently originated with the defendant in the case, Pennsylvania
Department of Transportation. See Dernbach, supra note 7, at 710.
127. See Dernbach, supra note 7, at 712.
128. See id. at 696 (noting that the test "utterly ignores the constitutional text" and "is so
weak that litigants using it to challenge environmentally damaging projects are almost always
unsuccessful"); Horwich, supra note 70, at 364 (concluding that the test "yield[s] merely
marginal benefits beyond Pennsylvania statutory law" and "strips the [constitutional] provision
of much substantive impact"); Pearson & Hutton, supra note 55, at 196 ("Unfortunately, rather
than propose a standard by which much environmental harm can be avoided, this test strikes a
25
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belief that the test is too deferential to state agency regulations, as
demonstrated by the fact that plaintiffs suing under section 27 have been
largely unsuccessful.'29
Nonetheless, there are several reasons why the Payne test need not
be the limit of environmental protection in Pennsylvania.'" First,
although part one of the test gives deference to statutes and regulations,
litigants can always challenge the constitutionality of such laws. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated that "[w]hile it is appropriate to
give due deference to a co-equal branch of government as long as it is
functioning within constitutional constraints, it would be a serious
dereliction on our part to deliberately ignore a clear constitutional
violation." 3' Thus, a court could overturn a particular law and thereby
foreclose application of the Payne test altogether.
Second, the Payne test represents a hurdle for plaintiffs challenging a
government decision in court-hence the use of the phrase "challenged
decision" in part 3 of the test. Arguably, the government itself is not
confined to this three-part test when planning and regulating land use. In
other words, a government could choose to be more protective than the
Payne test requires it to be. So long as it is acting within the scope of its
authority, and doing some balancing of environmental harm against other
social benefits, a government has discretion in fashioning environmental
review under its police powers.'32 Moreover, a government decision
denying or conditioning activities due to environmental harm will be
subject to review under a traditional abuse of discretion standard, thus
receiving judicial deference.
Finally, state agency jurisdiction goes only so far, which leaves a vast
universe of non-state-regulated, local land use activities affecting the
environment.134 There is an important opportunity for Pennsylvania's
balance against environmental values. . . . [I]t seems inexcusable to relegate these constitutional
values to such secondary status.").
129. See McLaren, supra note 3, at 139. For a list of examples where plaintiffs have lost, see
Wein, supra note 121, at 22-23.
130. Pennsylvania commentators concur that "the amendment still remains largely untested
as an environmental protection tool" and anticipate that future factual situations "could develop
and expand the amendment's current scope." See Wein, supra note 121, at 37.
131. Pa. AFL-CIO v. Commonwealth, 691 A.2d 1023, 1031 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997).
132. See discussion supra Part I.A. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated that
although balancing is required, no specific balancing test is mandated. See Eagle Envtl. II v.
Commonwealth, 884 A.2d 867, 879 (Pa. 2005) (upholding Department of Environmental
Protection review criteria for landfill permits, which contain a harms/benefits test with differing
language from the Payne test).
133. See In re Fried-El Corp. v. Borough of Monroeville, 474 A.2d 713, 717 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1984).
134. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
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local governments to step forward and implement land use regulations
that "fill the gap" and more fully protect section 27 rights."'
In the 1970s Pennsylvania was considered to be among those states
delegating the most power over land use to local governments, allowing a
full range of planning, zoning, and subdivision authority.'" These laws
exist in a substantively similar form today, with little or no specificity
concerning environmental review, and with the exercise of all regulatory
powers being discretionary. 3 7 The laws, however, do contain a list of land
use activities over which the state has preempted local government
authority, such as mining, oil and gas, and concentrated animal
operations." Further, county subdivision review powers apply only to
land divisions resulting in three or more lots.139
To guide local governments, Pennsylvania has a state Environmental
Master Plan-a unique regulatory document that contains policy
statements intended to help local governments properly consider
environmental factors in land use." The Plan does not read as a binding
mandate, but it specifically calls on local governments to implement its
goals through regulations and decision making.14' Since 1973, local
governments have also held authority to create local environmental
advisory councils to conduct fact finding and set policy goals regarding
environmental issues in their communities.'42 Local governments also
share concurrent planning and permitting authority with the state in areas
135. See Dernbach, supra note 7, at 726-29, 731 (observing gaps in the current regulatory
scheme, especially related to suburban sprawl and loss of biodiversity); Wein, supra note 121, at
37 (listing possible future scenarios where the right may be implicated outside the state agency
permitting process).
136. See Thomas M. Schmidt, Laws Which Regulate Land Use in Pennsylvania, 46 PA. BAR
AsS'N Q. 417,421-24 & n.18 (1975).
137. See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 10301, 10503, 10603-10604 (West 2010) (on planning,
subdivision, and zoning, respectively).
138. See id. § 10603(b). In the area of oil and gas, however, the courts have recently
recognized limited authority to regulate the placement of gas wells through zoning, so long as
the local government does not tread on the state's authority to regulate the technical aspects of
the gas development. See Huntley & Huntley, Inc. v. Borough of Oakmont, 964 A.2d 855, 864-
66 (Pa. 2009) (upholding borough's denial of gas well drilling in a residentially zoned district
where oil and gas wells were not a permitted or conditional use); Penneco Oil Co. v. Cnty. of
Fayette, 4 A.3d 722, 730-33 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010) (upholding county zoning ordinance that
permitted oil and gas development only in certain zoning districts and only by special exception
because the primary purpose of the ordinance was to "preserv[e] the character of residential
neighborhoods"). Cf Range Resources-Appalachia, LLC v. Salem Twp., 964 A.2d 869, 875-77
(Pa. 2009) (invalidating township ordinance that comprehensively regulated technical aspects of
oil and gas development as preempted by state law). Although amici in the Range Resources-
Appalachia decision argued that article 1, section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution should be
applied so that there are "shared state and local responsibilities to protect the environment" in
oil and gas development, the court did not address this argument. See id. at 873.
139. See 16 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5204 (West 2010).
140. See 25 PA. CODE §§ 9.1-.301 (West 2010).
141. See id. § 9.3(k). Discussed further infra Part III.A.
142. See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2322, 2324 (West 2010).
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like air pollution, sewage, and development along the Appalachian
Trail.'43 Thus, on the whole, great potential exists for Pennsylvania local
governments to engage in environmental planning and use their broad
land use powers to implement environmental goals.
C. Montana Constitution
Article II (Inalienable Rights), Section 3:
All persons are born free and have certain inalienable rights. They
include the right to a clean and healthful environment and the rights
of pursuing life's basic necessities, enjoying and defending their lives
and liberties, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and
seeking their safety, health and happiness in all lawful ways. In
enjoying these rights, all persons recognize corresponding
responsibilities.
Article IX (Environment & Natural Resources), Section 1:
The state and each person shall maintain and improve a clean and
healthful environment in Montana for present and future generations.
The legislature shall provide for the administration and enforcement
of this duty. The legislature shall provide adequate remedies for the
protection of the environmental life support system from degradation
and provide adequate remedies to prevent unreasonable depletion
and degradation of natural resources.
In 1972 Montana adopted a new state constitution containing two
separate environmental clauses that reflect a corresponding
environmental right and environmental duty. Whereas the other states
speak of a duty to maintain the environment, Montana stands alone in
requiring a duty to maintain and improve the environment-a duty that
extends both to the government and the people. Those calling for a
constitutional convention in the late 1960s cited the "compelling need for
stronger constitutional provisions to ensure environmental protection."'"
The convention commission also "stressed the citizen's right to a
healthful environment as a priority issue."'45
While the convention delegates rigorously debated the phrasing of
the environmental clauses, they were in accord that the right would be
the "strongest constitutional environmental section of any existing state
143. See 35 PA. STAT. ANN. §H 4004(19), 4012 (West 2010) (air); 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 750.8
(West 2010) (sewage); 64 PA. STAT. ANN. § 804 (West 2010) (trail).
144. Deborah Beaumont Schmidt & Robert J. Thompson, The Montana Constitution and
the Right to a Clean & Healthful Environment, 51 MONT. L. REV. 411, 414 (1990) (citing
LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF MONTANA, A BETTER CONSTITUTION FOR BETTER
GOVERNMENT 5 (1969)).
145. Id. (citing MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMISSION, STUDY No. 10,
BILL OF RIGHTS 250 (1971)).
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constitution."" Unlike the Illinois constitutional delegates, who rejected
use of the word "clean,"147 the Montana delegates chose both "clean" and
"healthful" to describe the type of environment to which citizens are
entitled. Viewed within the larger article II declaration of rights, the right
to a clean and healthful environment appears in the section on
inalienable rights, listed ahead of other individual rights such as freedom
of religion, assembly, and speech, which appear in later sections. And
within the inalienable rights section, the environmental right is listed
ahead of the other inalienable rights such as "acquiring, possessing and
protecting property." This constitutional prioritizing has been borne out
in the case law, where the Montana Supreme Court, similar to the Illinois
courts, has placed environmental protections ahead of property rights."
Whereas Pennsylvania's case law began developing almost
immediately after adoption of its environmental rights provision, 149
Montana's environmental provisions lay relatively dormant for two
decades. During this period, scholars speculated as to whether the
Montana courts would limit the provisions the way the Pennsylvania and
Illinois courts had done and argued for a stronger application of
Montana's environmental right."so
In 1999 the Montana Supreme Court resolved many of those
questions when it issued its landmark decision in Montana Environmental
Information Center v. Department of Environmental Quality (MEIC),
holding that Montana's right to a clean and healthful environment is a
fundamental right that requires the government to show a compelling
state interest before allowing environmental harm to occur."' In MEIC,
the plaintiffs challenged a mining exploration license and related permits
that allowed a company to discharge arsenic into the Blackfoot River and
Landers Fork River.'52 These rivers provide important fish and wildlife
habitat, including critical spawning and rearing habitat for the threatened
146. Verbatim Transcripts of March 1, 1972, 4 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
1200, 1214 (1971-72).
147. See Glisson v. City of Marion, 720 N.E.2d 1034, 1042 (Ill. 1999) ("'Healthful' is chosen
rather than 'clean,' . . . because 'healthful' describes the environment in terms of its direct effect
on human life while the other suggestions describe the environment more in terms of physical
characteristics.").
148. See State ex rel. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Scis. v. Green, 739 P.2d 469, 473 (Mont. 1987)
(holding that law regulating motor vehicle junkyards validly protects right to a clean
environment and outweighs property interests); State v. Bernhard, 568 P.2d 136, 138-39 (Mont.
1977) (same); see also discussion supra Part II.A regarding Illinois.
149. See discussion supra Part II.B.
150. See, e.g., Tobias & McLean, supra note 71, at 252-66; Daniel Kemmis, Comment,
Environmental Rights, The Montana Constitution: Taking New Rights Seriously, 39 MONT. L.
REv. 224,233-37 (1978).
151. Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 1999 MT 248, 296 Mont. 207, 988
P.2d 1236, 1246-49.
152. See id. at 1238.
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Bull Trout.5 3 By using groundwater mixing zones, the company proposed
to dilute the arsenic to levels below applicable state water quality
standards; however, the discharge was nonetheless "at greater
concentrations than existed in the receiving water."'54 The state agency
granted the exploration license under a statutory exemption that allowed
such discharges without nondegradation review.'
The supreme court applied strict scrutiny to the agency's actions,
concluding that there was no compelling reason to allow such an
exemption."' The ruling was also notable for its prospective view of
environmental harm: the possibility of environmental harm is sufficient to
state a cognizable claim. In historic language, the court stated:
[W]e conclude that the delegates' intention was to provide language
and protections which are both anticipatory and preventative. The
delegates did not intend to merely prohibit that degree of
environmental degradation which can be conclusively linked to ill
health or physical endangerment. Our constitution does not require
that dead fish float on the surface of our state's rivers and streams
before its farsighted environmental protections can be invoked.157
Based on Montana's strong constitutional language and the judiciary's
strong affirmation of environmental rights, Montana's environmental
provisions are considered the most robust of all the state environmental
rights provisions."'
Although environmental litigants in Montana now routinely raise
environmental rights claims based on MEIC, the court has largely
avoided those claims when there are other paths to resolving the cases.159
Given the limited number of court rulings, many contours of the right
remain to be defined. One notable exception is Cape-France Enterprises
v. Estate of Lola H. Peed, where the court applied environmental rights in
the context of a private contract and described a compelling interest as
"at a minimum, some interest of the highest order and . .. not otherwise
being served or the gravest abuse endangering a paramount government
153. See id.
154. Id.
155. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-5-317(2)(j) (2009).
156. See Mont. Envt. Info. Ctr., 988 P.2d at 1249.
157. Id. (reversing the district court's holding that plaintiffs had to demonstrate a threat to
public health or "significant impact" to current water quality before environmental rights would
be implicated).
158. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Constitutionalizing the Environment: The History and
Future of Montana's Environmental Provisions, 64 MONT. L. REv. 157, 165-74 (2003)
[hereinafter Constitutionalizing]; Jason J. Czarnezki, Environmentalism and the Wisconsin
Constitution, 90 MARO. L. REV. 465, 483-84 (2007).
159. See, e.g., Merlin Myers Revocable Trust v. Yellowstone Cnty., 2002 MT 201, 311 Mont.
194, 53 P.3d 1268, 1272. ("This Court has repeatedly recognized that courts should avoid
constitutional issues whenever possible.").
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interest."'" But even on this issue the court has yet to hear a case where
the state has demonstrated a compelling interest. Further, as scholar
Barton "Buzz" Thompson has observed, the court has not yet delved into
the more difficult scenario of a permit issued after an agency has done
full environmental review.161 While practitioners can only speculate on
what the court might do in such a situation, one probable forecast is that
the court will part company with Pennsylvania by more rigorously
scrutinizing the agency's fact finding when environmental rights are
implicated.162
Like Pennsylvania and Illinois, Montana's zoning enabling statutes
predate its environmental rights provision and make very little mention
of the environment at all.'63 Thus, in this area local governments are left
to chart their own courses in implementing environmental rights. And,
like the other two states, Montana has major environmental gaps in its
enabling statutes-most notably in the significant types of land
development exempted from subdivision review, such as divisions
resulting in lots 160 acres or greater1" and divisions among family
members.165 Additionally, "minor" subdivisions can be sequentially
created without environmental assessment.16 In zoning, as mentioned
above, counties are precluded from fully regulating mining, sand, and
gravel extraction activities.' Further, individual landowners can use a
statutory protest provision to prevent county lands from being zoned,
circumventing local authority over environmental protection." These
gaps are reminiscent of the categorical mining exemption at issue in
MEIC, suggesting a path for future legal challenges.
160. Cape-France Enters. v. Estate of Lola H. Peed, 2001 MT 139, 305 Mont. 513, 29 P.3d
1011, 1017 (internal quotation marks omitted). Discussed supra note 51.
161. See Thompson, Constitutionalizing, supra note 158, at 179-80, 183-93. This is in
contrast with the facts of MEIC, which involved agency approval without environmental review.
Discussed supra in the text accompanying notes 150-155.
162. Cf Clark Fork Coal. v. Mont. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 2008 MT 407, 347 Mont. 197, 197
P.3d 482, 488, 491-92 (concluding that ordinary agency review applies if the constitutionality of
an environmental statute or regulation is not raised, but also concluding the agency abused its
discretion under the facts of the case).
163. See sources cited supra note 69.
164. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 76-3-103(15), -104 (2009). While this is a much broader
definition than Illinois' subdivision definition, it still leaves room for great environmental harm.
As one example, consider Plum Creek Timber Company subdividing and developing thousands
of acres of its unzoned land holdings in the Crown of the Continent into parcels of 160 acres,
each with a new residence and a new road system, without any environmental review. While the
government and conservation groups have stepped forward to purchase some of these lands,
thousands of acres remain open to development. For more information, see Montana Legacy
Project, NATURE CONSERVANCY, http://www.nature.org/wherewework/northamericalstates/
montana/preserves/art29100.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2010).
165. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(1)(b) (2009).
166. See id. § 76-3-609(2).
167. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-2-209 (2009).
16& See id. § 76-2-205(6).
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On the other hand, the enabling statutes for both planning and
subdivision review do contain some post-constitutional provisions that
provide more environmental guidance. The Growth Policy Act, for those
jurisdictions wishing to adopt a growth policy, requires a survey of
natural resources and encourages the use of "land use incentives and
techniques" that will reduce environmental harms.169 The Subdivision &
Platting Act also requires environmental assessments for certain "major"
subdivisions, along with requiring all reviewed subdivisions to be
examined for their impacts to wildlife, wildlife habitat, public health, and
the natural environment.o Local governments enjoy concurrent
jurisdiction over water and sanitation in subdivisions, as well as authority
to enact more stringent regulations than the state.17' Thus, Montana local
governments, like those in Illinois and Pennsylvania, are generally well
situated to design local plans and regulations that address environmental
rights.
D. Hawaii Constitution
Article XI (Conservation, Control and Development of Resources),
Sections 1 and 9:
For the benefit of present and future generations, the State and its
political subdivisions shall conserve and protect Hawaii's natural
beauty and all natural resources, including land, water, air, minerals
and energy sources, and shall promote the development and
utilization of these resources in a manner consistent with their
conservation and in furtherance of the self-sufficiency of the State.
All public natural resources are held in trust by the State for the
benefit of the people.
Each person has the right to a clean and healthful environment, as
defined by laws relating to environmental quality, including control of
pollution and conservation, protection and enhancement of natural
resources.
Hawaii in 1978 was the last of the states to create an environmental
rights provision. As the above provisions reflect, Hawaii has paired its
environmental rights provision (article XI, section 9) with a separate
public trust provision for natural resources (article XI, section 1). Like
Montana, Hawaii chose "clean and healthful" to modify its
environmental right. Its public trust provision embraces a broad array of
169. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-1-601 (2009).
170. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 76-3-603, -608 (2009). Further, these criteria are a statutory
minimum that can be augmented by local government subdivision regulations. See Burnt Fork
Citizens Coal. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 951 P.2d 1020, 1023-24 (Mont. 1997).
171. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-3-511 (2009).
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natural resources beyond the water resources traditionally associated
with the common law public trust doctrine. Following similar rulings in
the other environmental rights states, the Hawaii Supreme Court has held
that local government land use decisions must consider and uphold these
environmental rights provisions, even when state agencies also play a role
in the environmental review process.172
Although more case law has focused on section 1 than section 9, both
provisions substantively relate to the environment and practitioners can
thus draw on section 1 jurisprudence when interpreting section 9.
Additionally, the Hawaii courts have created an analytical framework for
another resource-based right that appears in the Hawaii Constitution at
article XII, section 7-the gathering rights of native Hawaiians." While
the native rights provision is worded differently than the environmental
rights provision, there is potential to draw on native rights jurisprudence
as well when analyzing section 9 claims.
At least one commentator has concluded that section 9 does not
create a substantive right, but rather is "defined by statutes,
administrative rules, and ordinances." 174 Certainly, section 9 looks to
enacted laws to define what is "clean and healthful," but a conclusion that
the right is no greater than those laws is problematic. For example, if a
statute is silent regarding an environmental issue, does that mean no right
exists in that particular context? Or, is it sufficient to simply meet the
procedural requirement of submitting an environmental impact statement
(EIS), but then proceed to choose an alternative that harms a citizen's
right to a clean and healthful environment? Presumably, such outcomes
would not be reasonable under article XI, section 9. A conclusion that
statutes are coextensive with a constitutional right runs counter to the
recognized reality that statutes sometimes fall short of fully protecting
constitutional rights and contradicts the general proposition that statutes
172. See Kelly v. 1250 Oceanside Partners, 140 P.3d 985, 1002-06 (Haw. 2006). This holding
makes sense when considering that environmental review under Hawaii Environmental Policy
Act (HEPA) is informational only and does not require that the government actually choose an
alternative that protects environment rights. See infra note 186 and accompanying text. Further,
HEPA contains many exemptions for land use activities. See infra note 187 and accompanying
text. Thus, a local government must go beyond any HEPA analysis to ensure meaningful
environmental protection within its jurisdiction.
173. Article XII, section 7 reads: "The State reaffirms and shall protect all rights,
customarily and traditionally exercised for subsistence, cultural and religious purposes and
possessed by ahupua'a tenants who are descendants of native Hawaiians who inhabited the
Hawaiian Islands prior to 1778, subject to the right of the State to regulate such rights." For the
analytical framework, see Ka Pa'akai 0 Ka'Aina v. Land Use Commission, 7 P.3d 1068, 1083-84
(Haw. 2000), which is discussed in Chasid M. Sapolu, Comment, Dumping on the Wai'Nae Coast:
Achieving Environmental Justice Through the Hawai'i State Constitution, 11 ASIAN-PAC. L. &
POL'Y J. 204, 239-40 (2010).
174. David Kimo Frankel, Enforcement of Environmental Laws in Hawaii, 16 U. HAW. L.
REv. 85, 134-35 (1994).
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cannot legislate away a constitutional protection."' Indeed, the Hawaii
Supreme Court has held that: "While the [environmental] right is 'subject
to reasonable limitations and regulation as provided by law,' that
provision does not suggest that legislative action is needed before the
right can be implemented. Put another way ... the right exists and can be
exercised even in the absence of such [reasonable] limitations."176
Further, in a case involving native rights, the Hawaii Supreme Court
has stated that, even when deferring to agency expertise, "[w]e answer
questions of constitutional law by exercising our own 'independent
constitutional judgment [based] on the facts of the case . . . . [T]his court
is the 'ultimate judicial tribunal with final, unreviewable authority to
interpret and enforce the Hawai'i Constitution."1 7  In the context of the
public trust, the court has noted that agency discretion is circumscribed
by constitutional doctrine: the courts, not agencies, hold the ultimate
authority to interpret and defend constitutional rights.7 7 Also with
respect to the public trust, the court has held that state codes do not
subsume or supplant constitutional provisions; that courts will take a
"'close look' at the agency action to determine if it complies with the
public trust doctrine"; and that courts will not act "merely as a rubber
stamp for agency or legislative action.""' Further, regarding agency
application of the Hawaii Environmental Policy Act (HEPA), the court
has said that "blind deference" is "not appropriate.""s A similar analysis
should extend to section 9 rights, as there is no reason to believe the
courts would relinquish their traditional powers over environmental
rights when they have so ardently asserted those powers when deciding
other environmental constitutional questions.
Scholars are correct, however, in observing that Hawaii depends
heavily on state environmental statutes and implementing regulations to
carry out the provisions of section 9. As noted in Part I, the state relies
upon the Hawaii Coastal Zone Management Act, with a significant
amount of environmental review authority delegated to the counties.181
And most significantly, the state relies on HEPA.82 The types of actions
subject to HEPA are quite broad, extending to numerous local land use
175. See discussion supra Parts I.A.2-3.
176. Cnty. of Haw. v. Ala Loop Homeowners, 235 P.3d 1103, 1125 (Haw. 2010).
177. Ka Pa'akai 0 Ka'Aina, 7 P.3d at 1078.
178. See Kelly v. 1250 Oceanside Partners, 140 P.3d 985, 1010 (Haw. 2006); Waiahole, 9 P.3d
409, 445 (Haw. 2000).
179. Waiahole, 9 P.3d at 442-43, 456.
180. Sierra Club v. Dep't of Transp., 167 P.3d 292, 310 & n.26 (Haw. 2007) (discussing
agency exemptions and noting that California courts employ de novo review of agency
exemptions).
181. See HAW. REv. STAT. § 205A-4, -26 (West 2009). Discussed in Mahuiki v. Kauai
Planning Comm'n, 654 P.2d 874, 878 (Haw. 1982).
182. See HAW. REv. STAT. § 343 (West 2009).
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actions such as amendments to county plans, the use of conservation
lands and shoreline areas,183 and the reclassification of conservation
lands." HEPA, however, is like NEPA in being informational only, and
not substantive.'" Further, HEPA has categorical exemptions for certain
land use activities-single-family residences, multiplexes involving less
than four units, small businesses, and zoning variances, to name a few-
which leave gaps in the environmental review of land useY" To the extent
that Hawaii's environmental right has been viewed as ineffective, the
criticisms have largely focused on the courts' deference to agency
decision making and a lack of enforcement of these environmental
statutes.187
Turning to Hawaii's land use laws, we find some marked differences
from the other environmental rights states. In 1961, just two years after
statehood, the Hawaii Legislature adopted the Hawaii Land Use Law," a
complex and unconventional land use model that involves state-wide
planning, state land classification, and state jurisdiction over selected
areas of land use decision making."' Planning begins at the state level and
then moves down to the county level with local planning that conforms to
the state plan.' Then in 1978 Hawaii enacted the Hawaii State Plan to
improve coordination among agencies and levels of government and to
"provide for wise use of Hawaii's resources." The Hawaii Supreme Court
has specifically held that the Hawaii land use laws are "environmental
laws" subject to article XI, section 9.191
The state Land Use Commission (LUC) has classified all land into
four major land use districts-urban, rural, agricultural, and
183. For a recent example of the interplay between local land use regulations and HEPA,
see Unite Here! Local 5 v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 231 P.3d 423 (Haw. 2010).
184. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 343-5 (West 2009). Discussed in Michael McPherson,
Vanishing Sands: Comprehensive Planning and the Public Interest in Hawaii, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q.
779, 807-08 (1991) (citing Life of the Land v. Ariyoshi, 577 P.2d 1116, 1121 (Haw. 1978));
Molokai Homesteaders Coop. Ass'n v. Cobb, 629 P.2d 1134, 1143 (Haw. 1981)).
185. The environmental review process is detailed in Lisa A. Bail et al., Emerging
Environmental and Land Use Issues, 9 HAW. B. J. 4,4-13 (2005).
186. See HAW. ADMIN. C. § 11-200-8 (West 2010).
187. See generally, e.g., Frankel, supra note 174; McPherson, supra note 184, at 807-08, 830-
31.
188. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 205 (West 2009).
189. See David L. Callies, The Interplay Between Land Use and Environmental Law, 23
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 685, 688-90 (spec. ed. 2006); DAVID L. CALLIES ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LAND USE 769 (5th ed. 2008); FRED BOSSELMAN & DAVID CALLIES, THE
QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL 7-13 (1971).
190. See generally HAW. REV. STAT. § 226-52 (West 2009). Unlike other states, Hawaii local
government land use regulation is housed in counties and not divided between counties and
cities. See infra notes 195-196 and accompanying text. Honolulu City-County is the notable
exception, but even there, the planning is via a consolidated government process. Department of
Planning and Permitting, CrrY & CNTY. HONOLULU, http://www.honoluludpp.org (last visited
Jan. 17, 2011).
191. See Cnty. of Haw. v. Ala Loop Homeowners, 235 P.3d 1103, 1122 (Haw. 2010).
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conservation-and has direct governance over conservation districts.19
The LUC also presides over the more significant reclassifications of land,
which occur either due to size or due to the land's location in a
conservation district." Counties otherwise retain considerable control
over decisions in the other land use districts and have full discretion to
decide permitted uses in urban districts. 94 Counties also have
considerable discretion in deciding how to conduct subdivision review in
the urban, rural, and agricultural districts because Hawaii, unlike
Montana, does not have a comprehensive statutory scheme for
subdivision review.195
Interestingly, Hawaii's land use classifications appear to assume that
environmental issues will largely be associated with conservation lands,
resulting in far less protections for the other districts. In agricultural
districts, for example, one commentator has noted the exploitation of a
"farm dwellings" loophole that allows large subdivisions to locate in
agricultural areas.196 Depending on location, these subdivisions could
indeed threaten the cleanliness and health of the area's environment.
Where these and other regulatory gaps exist, local governments will need
to step in with additional protections. To some extent they can fall back
on the state's codified environmental policy, which provides direction on
how local governments in Hawaii should use their authority to protect the
environment. Among the policy's goals are limiting population, balancing
economic activities with the environment, and "reduc[ing] the drain on
nonrenewable resources."'9
The above overview serves to provide local governments with the
larger environmental context into which they fit. Practitioners can
observe that each state constitutional provision has its own unique
phrasing and emphasis, along with unique judicial treatment. And each
state varies subtly in the authority delegated to local government, the
areas of state preemption, the areas of concurrent regulation, and the
areas in which more specific environmental criteria exist. Yet within each
state's framework lies a broad space for local regulation of the
192. See generally HAW. REV. STAT. § 205 (West 2009). The classifications are found in
§ 205-2.
193. See id. § 205-4.
194. See id. §§ 205-2, -3.1, -5, -6, -16. Discussed in McPherson, supra note 184, at 785-97;
JOHN R. NOLON ET AL., LAND USE AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 124-29 (7th ed. 2008).
195. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 205-5 (West 2009).
196. See generally Adrienne Iwamoto Suarez, Avoiding The Next Hokuli'a: The Debate Over
Hawai'i's Agricultural Subdivisions, 27 U. HAW. L. REV. 441 (2005) (citing HAW. REV. STAT. §
205-4.5 (West 2009)).
197. HAW. REV. STAT. § 344-3 (West 2009).
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environment-a space that the courts have said local governments must
occupy.198 Each state affords local government great discretion in
planning, zoning, and subdivision review, and some of the states have
strong policy statements and state level plans that can act as guideposts
on the local path to environmental rights protection. Each state also has
statutory and regulatory gaps that create the potential for local
governments to use litigation to protect against environmental harms.
1*
By synthesizing the statutory and case law from the environmental rights
states, practitioners can begin to design a local framework for protecting
rights in a more consistent, predictable, and legally defensible manner.
III. GETTING STARTED: DESIGNING A LOCAL FRAMEWORK THAT
APPROPRIATELY ADDRESSES ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS
This Part provides a starting place for designing local regulations
that address environmental rights in land use. While regulatory design is
a subject that can be covered far more extensively than this Article
allows, the topics in this Part can serve as a checklist of issues for
practitioners to consider in the design process. These topics are drawn
from common themes that have emerged in the statutes and case law of
the four environmental rights states,2" including:
* proactively addressing environment health at the
comprehensive planning stage;
* developing criteria for assessing environmental risks,
mitigation options, and countervailing public interests;
* determining how much weight should be placed on
environmental risks versus countervailing public interests;
* identifying the types of evidence that will be necessary to
decide environmental rights issues;
* making strong factual findings that will withstand
constitutional scrutiny;
* guarding against wrongful delegations of authority to
developers; and
* monitoring for ongoing compliance of environmental rights
after land use permits are issued.
Each local government will undoubtedly be unique in its approach.
In some communities that have already developed environmental land
use regulations, this process may simply be a matter of better
demarcating the connections between existing environmental provisions
198. See discussion supra Part I.A.2.
199. See discussion supra Part I.B.
200. When possible this Part cites precedent from each of the four states, but in some
instances a jurisdiction has not yet spoken on a particular topic.
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and the constitutional right to a healthful environment. In other
communities that have done very little with environmental regulation, the
effort will need to be deeper and more comprehensive.20' The local
government attorney plays an essential role in this process. As the
discussion in Part II made clear, numerous unresolved questions about
environmental rights exist that require analysis and educated guesses
from practitioners. The local government attorneys, and in some states
the Attorney General as well,2" will be integral to determining each local
government's scope of authority and ensuring compliance with state and
federal laws.
A. Invest in Up-Front Planning to Support Future Decision Making
Although the law does not presently mandate that comprehensive
plans address environmental rights, the benefits of doing so are
significant. Planning documents serve as the foundation for zoning and
subdivision review and thus are the starting place for environmental
rights regulation. Planning arguably is also the largest area of local
government freedom in that the contents of a plan are quite discretionary
and flexible. And the studies, policy statements, and goals contained in a
community's plan can provide the substantial evidence and rational basis
the local government needs to have its environmental decisions sustained
in litigation.203
The Hawaii Supreme Court has aptly observed that the first step in
resource planning should be a strong understanding of a community's
environmental needs.2" Taking this first step ameliorates the chances of
"inadvertent and needless impairment" of environmental resources and
reduces the "complexity and uncertainty presented by the unsettled
question of [environmental resource needs]."205 In contrast, the absence
of proactive planning means "risking an ad hoc planning process driven
by immediate demands."20 This latter scenario is the least desirable
because applicants lack certainty, there is no assurance that
environmental rights are being protected, and no genuine comprehensive
planning occurs.
201. Indeed, outside of Hawaii where planning is mandated, local government planning and
zoning is optional and many local governments have likely opted not to fully use their regulatory
authority. See overview of the states' land use laws supra Part II.
202. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-15-501(7) (2009); 15 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 205 / 4 (West
2010).
203. See 4 PATRICIA E. SALKIN, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 42.39 (5th ed. 2010).
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Thus, to begin planning, local jurisdictions should identify and set
goals for critical environmental areas such as water supply recharge areas,
habitat areas and corridors, forest areas, and existing areas of
contamination and pollution sources. Also important are areas of human
vulnerability, such as hospitals, residential areas, and school areas where
human health could be most at risk. While there are front-end costs
associated with studying, mapping, and setting goals, a local government
in the long run can better prove constitutional compliance-and perhaps
reduce the likelihood of litigation altogether-when its decisions and
regulations are undergirded by a strong rationale established in a land use
plan.
Hawaii is to some extent ahead of the pack in its mandatory planning
requirements and its identification of critical resource areas-
conservation districts, shoreline areas, and special management areas.
However, as noted, Hawaii's approach appears to overlook
environmental possibilities outside of these select land use designations.
Hawaii local governments should thus look beyond the state
classifications to ways that extend environmental protection to
agricultural, rural, and urban land use classifications.207
In Montana, growth policies are optional and many local
jurisdictions do not have one. But zoning cannot occur without a growth
policy, and both zoning and subdivision regulations must substantially
comply with the growth policy.2" Thus, the growth policy provides
immense regulatory leverage, particularly since it provides broad
authority to address natural resources, water supply, wildlife habitat, and
wildlife corridors. 209
Illinois and Pennsylvania also have promising state-level legislation
that supports local environmental planning. While Illinois' general
planning statutes are optional and lack an environmental focus, a
separate statute authorizes local governments to join forces and create
local land resource management plans to protect environmental
resources in their area.210 And although Pennsylvania's comprehensive
planning statutes indicate that planning is optional there as well, those
local governments that opt in must include a "plan for the protection of
natural . . . resources," including "wetlands and aquifer recharge zones,
woodlands, steep slopes, prime agricultural land, floodplains, [and]
unique natural areas."2 11 Pennsylvania also possesses one of the strongest
207. See discussion supra Part II.D and accompanying notes.
208. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-1-605 (2009).
209. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-1-601 (2009).
210. See supra notes 113 and 120 and accompanying text.
211. 53 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 10301-10302 (West 2010).
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state environmental master plans, with the most specific direction
regarding local environmental planning.212
Thus, local governments in all four environmental rights states hold
the authority to meaningfully plan for environmental rights protection
over the long term-a key step to fulfilling their constitutional mandate.
B. Develop Criteria that the Local Government Can Consistently Apply
in Land Use Decisions that Implicate the Environment
Turning to the land use regulations themselves, an important
preliminary step is to develop criteria that can be predictably and
consistently applied in zoning and subdivision review. Developing these
criteria will necessarily involve some comparative analysis of the four
environmental rights states because of the different wording of their
constitutional provisions and the existence of specific statutory and
judicial criteria. Nonetheless, there are commonalities. A survey of the
environmental rights jurisprudence consistently reveals four criteria that
local governments should address in land use: (1) the affected
environmental resources, (2) the risks posed to those resources, (3)
whether the risks can be adequately mitigated, and (4) any countervailing
public interests that support the proposed land use. While this Part will
later discuss the relative weight that each state places on these criteria,
the discussion will first use case law to help local governments better
understand what these criteria mean.
1. Affected Environmental Resources
To fully protect environmental rights, a local government must have
a reasonable understanding of the environmental resources affected by a
land use proposal.213 As a threshold matter, then, local governments must
determine what subjects are legally encompassed within the word
"environment" in their jurisdiction. As noted, Illinois has the narrowest
definition, which is limited to human health impacts and not impacts to
wildlife habitat.214 Pennsylvania's environmental clause has a long list of
protected resources, and the courts have accordingly extended the term
beyond human health impacts to historical properties, agricultural
operations, and aesthetic values.2 15 And contrary to Illinois, Pennsylvania
212. See supra notes 140-141 and accompanying text.
213. This factor would be similar to what the Hawaii Supreme Court requires in determining
whether native Hawaiian rights are protected during land development. There, the court
requires that the government consider "the identity and scope of 'valued cultural, historical, or
natural resources' in the petition area . . . ." Ka Pa'akai 0 Ka'Aina v. Land Use Comm'n, 7 P.3d
1068, 1084 (Haw. 2000). Discussed in Sapolu, supra note 173, at 239-40.
214. See supra Part II.A.
215. See Pa. Envtl. Mgmt. Servs. v. Commonwealth, 503 A.2d 477, 480 & n.9 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1986) (holding that agency must consider a landfill's impact on nearby mushroom farmers
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has officially recognized that impacts to wildlife habitat can harm humans
as well.216 Montana, through case law, has applied its right to human
health, wildlife habitat, and aesthetics.217 On the other hand, Montana
litigants lack standing to sue over a proposed land use that enhances the
environment but could have been designed to enhance the environment
even more. 218 Finally, Hawaii's Constitution also lists several types of
resources in its environmental clause, including human health, native
Hawaiian values, and non-physical impacts such as social and economic
costs to a community.2 19
Related to definitional scope is the question of geographic scope-
the area affected by the proposed land use. Even outside of the
environmental rights states, scholars have noted a judicial trend of
requiring local governments to examine environmental effects beyond
jurisdictional boundaries to all areas affected by a land use decision.220
This same logic should apply in environmental rights states since all
people within those states are entitled to constitutional protection,
regardless of where the cause of an environmental harm originates. Thus,
in Ka Pa'akai 0 Ka'Aina v. Land Use Commission, which involved a
proposed resort expansion on 235 acres within a special management
area, the Hawaii Supreme Court concluded that the LUC should have
considered impacts to native rights and cultural resources both within and
outside of the development site.22' While the LUC imposed a blanket
requirement that the developer address native rights within the 235 acres,
it failed to analyze or provide for protection of native trails or traditional
plant and salt gathering areas outside the development.22 2 Similarly, in
MEIC, which involved threatened arsenic pollution of an entire riverine
system, the Montana Supreme Court did not limit its analysis to the
mining site or place of discharge. 22 The Illinois courts have also declined
and fruit orchard owners, as well as the aesthetic intrusion on a nearby inn and residences);
Commonwealth v. Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 302 A.2d 886 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973)
(historic battlefield).
216. See 25 PA. CODE § 9.302 (2010).
217. See supra discussion Part II.C. and accompanying notes.
218. See Lohmeier v. Gallatin Cnty., 135 P.3d 775, 777-78 (Mont. 2006) (involving
allegations that newly created sewer district would provide more environmental protection if it
was enlarged to include plaintiffs' lands).
219. See supra Part II.D; Molokai Homesteaders Coop. Ass'n v. Cobb, 629 P.2d 1134, 1143
(Haw. 1981).
220. See, e.g., Reilly, supra note 55, at 51-52 nn.120-26.
221. See Ka Pa'akai 0 Ka'Aina v. Land Use Comm'n, 7 P.3d 1068, 1074, 1086 (Haw. 2000).
222. See id.
223. See Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 1999 MT 248, 296 Mont. 207, 988
P.2d 1236, 1237-38; supra Part II.C.; see also Franklin Twp. v. Commonwealth, 452 A.2d 718, 722
(Pa. 1982) (plurality opinion) (referring to site pollution as well as risks to the "surrounding
environment" of the community).
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to limit their inquiry to the subdivision site when the impacts of the
pollution extend to areas beyond the subdivided property.224
2. Risks Posed to Environmental Resources
The approaches to determining environmental risk are broad
ranging and cannot be fully detailed in this article. 22 Nonetheless, local
governments should proactively decide upon an approach that they can
consistently employ in decision making processes. Three important
considerations include: (a) factoring in any guidance from the state's
courts regarding environmental evidence, (b) using a reliable
methodology that is accepted in the scientific community, and (c) crafting
an approach that errs on the side of environmental protection.226
Beyond identifying the immediate, direct effects of a land use
proposal, the methodology should assess that proposal's cumulative
impacts when placed alongside other existing and proposed land uses in
the community. The rationale for cumulative impacts assessment has
been summarized aptly by the New Jersey Supreme Court in its
discussion of the Pinelands:
That land itself is a diminishing resource cannot be overemphasized.
Environmentally-sensitive land is all the more precious. Hence, a
proposed development that may constitute only a small insult to the
environment does not lessen the need to avoid such an offense. The
cumulative detrimental impact of many small projects can be
devastating. If exemptions should be granted because development
on individual tracts would impair only minutely the entire resources
of the Pinelands, the cumulative effect of such exemptions would
defeat the legislative goals of the Pinelands Protection Act.227
The need for cumulative impacts assessment is particularly
warranted in the environmental rights states, which are unanimous in
requiring that environmental protection extend to "future generations."22
224. See City of Springfield v. Hashman, 774 N.E.2d 427, 429-30, 436 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
225. For a recent sampling of scholarship in this area, see generally Irma S. Russell, Measure
for Measure: Cost-Benefit Analysis and Environmental Policy, 43 TULSA L. REv. 891 (2008);
Yusuf Esat, Note, The Influence of New Technology on the Common Law as Green Investment
Grows, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 203 (2009); Joshua J. Bruckerhoff, Note, Giving Nature
Constitutional Protection: A Less Anthropocentric Interpretation of Environmental Rights, 86
TEx. L. REV. 615 (2008); Albert C. Lin, The Unifying Role of Harm in Environmental Law, 2006
Wis. L. REv. 897 (2006).
226. See generally Michelle Bryan Mudd et al., The Role of Fish and Wildlife Evidence in
Land Use Regulation, 30 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REv. 107 (2009), for a detailed discussion
of environmental evidence in the land use context.
227. Gardner v. N.J. Pinelands Comm'n, 593 A.2d 251, 258 (N.J. 1991) (internal citations
omitted).
228. For a discussion of the difficulties associated with measuring harm across time appears,
see generally Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Trouble With Time: Influencing the Conservation
Choices of Future Generations, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 601 (2004).
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This command is a strong signal that government must look beyond the
artificial borders of a single development proposal to the bigger picture of
the developing landscape both today and in the future-the very essence
of land use planning.
Indeed, cumulative effects assessment is intertwined with and
reinforced by comprehensive planning, where communities identify
existing land uses and set the direction for future land use proposals. For
example, in the Illinois case of City of Springfield v. Hashman, the court
looked at the totality of existing and proposed subdivisions in a particular
drainage area and determined that the local government correctly denied
the Hashmans' subdivision based on the area's inability to handle
additional homes using septic systems.229 This evidence was corroborated
by the City's comprehensive plan, which called for a phasing out of septic
systems in the drainage due to environmental concerns.230
Among the constitutional rights states, Hawaii has been the most
direct about cumulative impacts. The HEPA and its related regulations,
which are intended to implement the state's environmental right, and
which apply to many land use decisions, specify that the cumulative
impacts of existing and proposed uses must be considered in the EA
process. 231 A similar analysis holds true for water resources subject to the
public trust under article XI, section 1.232
Montana's land use statutes are not as explicit regarding cumulative
impacts; however, Montana has begun applying some federal NEPA
standards to local government EAs in subdivision review.233 This strongly
suggests that the state will follow national trends and treat cumulative
impacts evidence as integral to local environmental assessment as well?
To conclude otherwise would be to undermine full consideration of
environmental rights impacts.
Hawaii has also been a leader in requiring consideration of
secondary, or indirect, impacts associated with a proposed land use." In
229. See City of Springfield v. Hashman, 774 N.E.2d 427, 429-30, 434 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
230. See id. at 429; see also Cmty. Coll. v. Fox, 342 A.2d 468, 481 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975)
(suggesting that local governments planning development of open space area will need to
consider broad effects of future development on that area).
231. See HAW. ADMIN. C. § 11-200-2 (West 2010) (defining cumulative impact); id. § 11-200-
7 (defining multiple actions); id. § 11-200-8(b) (cumulative impacts can override an exemption).
232. See Waiahole, 9 P.3d 409, 455 (Haw. 2000) (requiring state to examine cumulative
impacts of existing and proposed diversions on state's water resources before issuing new use
permits).
233. See, e.g., Aspen Trails Ranch, LLC v. Simmons, 2010 MT 79, 356 Mont. 41, 230 P.3d
808, 820 (adopting the "hard look" standard for local government review of EAs).
234. The state has already done so with respect to state agency environmental review.
Friends of the Wild Swan v. Dep't of Natural Res. and Conservation, 2000 MT 209, 301 Mont. 1,
6 P.3d 972, 977-78.
235. Some commentators also advocate for an inquiry of disparate impacts on marginalized
groups such as race or poverty See generally Klee, Robert J., What's Good for School Finance
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Sierra Club v. Department of Transportation, the Hawaii Supreme Court
considered whether agency review of state harbor work done in
preparation for the private Superferry project must consider the
secondary impacts posed by the ferry traffic." The Hawaii Department
of Transportation concluded that its harbor work posed only minimal
impacts and was thus exempt from HEPA.m The court disagreed and
held that secondary impacts from ferry traffic must be considered
because the Superferry project was "incident to and a consequence of the
primary impact" of the harbor work."
Pennsylvania similarly treats secondary effects as relevant, but has a
narrower view of what secondary effects are admissible. In Community
College, discussed supra Part I, a state board denied the college a permit
to run a sewer extension line into an undeveloped watershed that
included a state park. While the board concluded that the sewer
extension itself posed little environmental impact, it was concerned about
the secondary impacts of opening up the watershed to future
development.39 Once sewer service was available, the board noted that
local zoning would allow development to occur, causing erosion and
siltation, water supply pollution, and loss of open space lands.2 The
court disallowed this secondary effects evidence and defined secondary
effects to mean "such conditions as will almost certainly occur as a result
of the action taken, and conditions such that current law and technology
provide no reasonable means to control them."241 Anything outside this
definition, the court concluded, would be too speculative, including
concerns about future local government development approvals.242 The
court appeared to see environmental rights in a bifurcated way, where
litigants could later challenge the development itself by separately suing
Should Be Good for Environmental Justice: Addressing Disparate Environmental Impacts Using
State Courts and Constitutions, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 135 (2005); Sapolu, supra note 173, at
218-28.
236. Sierra Club v. Dep't of Transp., 167 P.3d 292 (Haw. 2007).
237. See id. at 331-36.
238. See id.; see also Kahana Sunset Owners Ass'n v. Cnty. of Maui, 947 P.2d 378, 386-87
(Haw. 1997) (holding environmental assessment should have considered impact of an entire
proposed development rather than simply the development's drainage system). For a discussion
on the harms of the Superferry project, see generally Jordon J. Kimura, The Environmental
Assessment: Issues Surrounding the Exclusion of Project Significantly Affecting Hawai'i's Fragile
Environment, 10 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 168, 180-81 (2008).
239. See Cmty. Coll. v. Fox, 342 A.2d 468,472-73 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975).
240. See id.
241. Id. at 479 (emphasis added).
242. See id. The court also noted its belief that environmental harms would be addressed by
existing erosion control laws applied at the local level. See id. at 480; see also Swartwood v.
Commonwealth, 424 A.2d 993, 996 (Pa. Conmmw. Ct. 1981) (concluding that state agency need
only consider impacts of sewage plan, and not resulting development that would rely on sewage
services, because separate litigation can proceed against local government for permitting
housing).
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local governments for environmental rights violations.243 Thus, the
Pennsylvania rule stands in contrast with Hawaii's rule in Sierra Club.
In Montana, risk assessment must include the possibility that
mitigating measures may fail. In Aspen Trails Ranch, LLC v. Simmons, a
Montana subdivision developer submitted an EA that did not analyze the
impacts of sewage on groundwater. 2" The developer assumed that the
subdivision would have no impact because of its connection to the
municipal sewer.245 The subdivision, however, had a high groundwater
table, and the court concluded that the county committed reversible error
by not analyzing the possibility of sewer pipe leakage into the
groundwater.'
Finally, local governments should be cautious when using categorical
exemptions that assume no risk exists for particular land uses. To
streamline review, local governments may be tempted to consider
identifying land use activities that ordinarily do not create an impact and
then exempt those activities from environmental review. But the risk with
this strategy is that a particular land use proposal defies the norm and
does pose an environmental harm. This puts local government in the
same precarious legal position as the agency in Montana's MEIC
decision-relying on a categorical exemption to approve a high-risk
permit without appropriate environmental review.247 Thus, local
government regulations must include a safety-valve provision that allows
the government to disregard an exemption when environmental harm
may occur. One model that could be extended to the local level is the
Hawaii Administrative Rule, which forecloses the use of EIS exemptions
when there is an unacceptable cumulative impact or an impact on a
particularly sensitive environment.2"
3. Mitigation of Harm
Mitigation of harm is also a relevant criterion in all four
environmental rights states. Perhaps the clearest example is found in the
second part of Pennsylvania's Payne test, which explicitly contemplates
mitigation whenever environmental harm occurs with land use. 249 Thus,
243. Fox, 342 A.2d at 468; Swartwood, 424 A.2d at 996.
244. Aspen Trails Ranch, LLC v. Simmons, 2010 MT 79, 356 Mont. 41, 230 P.3d 808, 812-15,
821.
245. See id.
246. See id.; see also Clark Fork Coal. v. Mont. Dep't Envtl. Quality, 2008 MT 407, 347
Mont. 197, 197 P.3d 482, 491-92 (finding error when agency assumed mining company would
perpetually treat mining discharge into Clark Fork River even though company was unlikely to
perpetually exist).
247. See supra discussion Part II.C.
248. See HAW. ADMIN. C. § 11-200-8(b) (West 2010).
249. See Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 94 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973).
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even if there is not a specific statute or local ordinance that speaks to
mitigation, local governments in Pennsylvania must make a "reasonable
effort to reduce the environmental impact to a minimum" in order for
their decisions to pass constitutional muster.20 In the context of public
trust, Hawaii likewise requires "reasonable measures to mitigate" impacts
to resources."
In Montana subdivision review, mitigation is expressly required by
statute." If mitigation is not possible, then denial of the subdivision is
appropriate." While a local government must consider a subdivider's
preferred method of mitigation, it is not obligated to choose methods that
do not appropriately address the environmental risk. 4 Outside of
subdivision review, the requirement for mitigation is present on a more
implicit level, found in passing observations made by the Montana
Supreme Court in cases such as Merlin Myers, where the court reminded
a local government that it could use its authority to impose mitigating
conditions on a gravel extraction permit in order to avoid perceived
environmental harms."s
With mitigation can come expense to the developer-costs some
developers have challenged, albeit with little success. In Illinois, for
example, when a mobile home park developer challenged the costs of
connecting to the municipal sewage treatment plant, the court said that
mitigation cannot be based on cost considerations alone. 5 6 Rather, it was
necessary for the government to consider scientific data, knowledge of
technologies, and the application of technical standards as well? And in
the Waiahole decision, the Hawaii Supreme Court affirmed a
requirement that the water user pay for water studies, so long as the costs
were reasonable, because the user stood to benefit from the use of the
water."'
Finally, as discussed below, the local government must carefully
support any mitigating conditions it imposes by making specific findings
of fact. Assuming mitigation will occur, or relying too heavily on vague
developer promises to mitigate, could constitute reversible error.
250. See Blue Mountain Pres. Ass'n v. Town of Eldred, 867 A.2d 692, 704 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2005).
251. See Waiahole, 9 P.3d 409, 455 (Haw. 2000).
252. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-3-608(5) (2009).
253. See id.
254. See, e.g., Richards v. Cnty. of Missoula, 2009 MT 453, 354 Mont. 334, 223 P.3d 878, 881-
82 (concluding that an electric fence around a subdivision located in an elk migration corridor
would be inadequate mitigation).
255. Merlin Myers Revocable Trust v. Yellowstone Cnty., 2002 MT 201, 311 Mont. 194, 53
P.3d 1268, 1272. Discussed supra Part I.C.
256. See Jurcak v. Ill. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 513 N.E.2d 1007, 1011 (111. App. Ct. 1987).
257. See id.
258. Waiahole, 9 P.3d 409, 497-98 (Haw. 2000).
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4. Countervailing Public Interests
To a greater or lesser degree, each environmental rights state also
considers countervailing public interests served by the proposed land use.
Pennsylvania's Payne test requires governments to factor in the "benefits
derived" from the proposed land use activity. 9 The state has
consequently upheld the construction of power utilities,2 6 water storage
utilities,261 and a myriad of other activities promising large community
benefits despite their environmental detriments.262
Hawaii, in the context of public trust, has concluded that government
"inevitably must weigh competing public and private ... uses on a case-
by-case basis." And Montana leaves a small margin of room for
considering countervailing interests that are "compelling." 263 While
Montana's case law has not yet provided an example of what
circumstances qualify as compelling in the land use context, the state
supreme court has held that such an interest is "at a minimum, some
interest of the highest order and . . . not otherwise being served or the
gravest abuse endangering a paramount government interest."2 6
Illinois provides an example of a countervailing interest in the form
of safe water supply. In Glisson v. City of Marion, the court began its case
description by stating "The City of Marion has a water supply
problem."265 The proposed land use activity was the damming of Sugar
Creek to serve as an alternative water supply for the City of Marion,
which had a limited water supply that was of poor quality, requiring
"substantial chemical treatment to render it suitable for human
consumption." 2' Agency review under an EIS concluded that the project
would be "environmentally sustainable." The plaintiff, however, argued
that the project violated his environmental rights by threatening the
habitat of the least brook lamprey and the Indiana crayfish, along with
threatening his interests in "food gathering, recreation, and spiritual and
educational activities" 26 - interests the court deemed unprotected by the
259. See Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 94 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973).
260. See Commonwealth v. Commonwealth, 335 A.2d 860 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975).
261. See Flowers v. Northampton Bucks Cnty. Mun. Auth., 57 Pa. D. & C.2d 274 (C.P.
Bucks Cnty. Pa. 1972).
262. Despite this trend, local governments in Pennsylvania are making some inroads in
zoning the location of oil and gas development a significant legal development during a time
when Pennsylvania is experiencing significant oil and gas development pressures. See supra note
138.
263. See Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr., 1999 MT 248, 296 Mont. 207, 988 P.2d 1236, 1246.
264. Cape-France Enters. v. Estate of Lola H. Peed, 2001 MT 139, 395 Mont. 513, 29 P.3d
1011, 1017 (internal quotation marks omitted).
265. Glisson v. City of Marion, 720 N.E.2d 1034, 1037 (Ill. 1999).
266. Id.
267. Id. at 1037.
268. Id. at 1038.
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environmental rights clause.269 While the court ultimately dismissed the
claims based on lack of standing, its evidentiary emphasis on the City's
need for higher quality water is worth noting.
Another possible countervailing interest is needed sewage treatment
facilities. The court in Butler Township Board of Supervisors v.
Commonwealth upheld a Pennsylvania state agency order requiring three
communities to build a sewage treatment plant where an existing sewer
system was "aged and deteriorated" and "inadequately treated or
untreated sewage" was overflowing into an abandoned mine pit and local
creek.270 The court observed that while the location of the facilities
presented some risk of harm due to proximity to drinking water supplies,
"the environmental benefits to be gained by implementation of [the]
order unquestionably outweigh the environmental harms and adverse
effects, if any. "271
When a local government chooses to allow a land use because of
strong countervailing interests, it may understandably be concerned that
the promised public benefits of the proposal may not materialize. In this
situation, at least one court has held that it is appropriate to require the
developer to fulfill promised benefits as a condition of approval, or risk
permit revocation. In Eagle Environmental II v. Commonwealth,272 a
Pennsylvania landfill operator listed several environmental and economic
benefits that would result if its proposed landfill were built, including
habitat rehabilitation and additional jobs for the community.273 There, the
state agency applied a harms/benefits analysis before approving the
permit.274 The state agency also imposed a condition that stated: "Failure
to provide for all benefits described in these submissions would invalidate
the Harms/Benefits analysis and will be a violation of this permit." 275 The
landfill operator argued that the condition was unreasonable because
events beyond its control, such as market forces, could cause the failure
to provide a predicted benefit.276 Nonetheless, the court upheld the
agency's condition because the government has a duty to ensure that the
mitigation measures actually result in adequate protection of the
environment.277
269. See id. at 1045.
270. Butler Twp. Bd. of Supervisors v. Commonwealth, 513 A.2d 508, 510 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1986).
271. Id. at 513.
272. Eagle Envtl. II v. Commonwealth, 884 A.2d 867 (Pa. 2005).
273. See id. at 871-72.
274. See id. at 872.
275. Id.
276. See id. at 878.
277. See id.
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C. Determine the Weight Accorded to the Environmental Right
After gathering evidence concerning the above criteria, a local
government must then decide if the land use can proceed in light of any
identified environmental risks. This decision turns in large part on the
weight the local government places on the environmental right. While
some scholars argue that an environmental right should not be balanced
against other public interests and deserves "unyielding protection,"278
most recognize that it would be an unworkable standard to halt all land
use that intrudes upon the environment because that "demands more
than human society is capable of."279 Indeed, each environmental rights
state recognizes that there must as a matter of reality be some
consideration of the social values of land use.o
Where the states diverge is on the weight given to those
countervailing social values. Pennsylvania stands alone in placing more
weight on social values than environmental rights; under the third part of
its Payne test, the environmental harm must "clearly outweigh" the
benefits of the proposed land use.28 This test furthers the court's stated
conclusion that article I, section 27 allows "a controlled development of
resources rather than no development."282 In essence, Pennsylvania has
"abandoned the concept of parity between the environmental right and
other fundamental rights,"" "preferring to permit [its] citizens to trade
some environmental health risks for economic benefits" so long as the
risk is not too great.'
As scholar Daniel Kemmis has observed, "[w]e would be shocked if
a court upheld an infringement of free speech because some economic
278. E.g., Brooks, supra note 3, at 1066 n.17.
279. Kemmis, supra note 150, at 235-36; see also Robert T. Mann & Richard Jackson,
Environmental Protection through Constitutional Amendment, 1 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 385,
404-05 (1985) ("[T]he expression 'healthful environment' does not indicate an absolute, all-or-
nothing concept. No one contends that all automobiles must stop and that all impurities must be
eliminated.. . .").
280. For a discussion of this inevitable balancing, see Czarnezki, supra note 158, at 490-94;
Thompson, Substantive Guidance, supra note 3, at 872-73; Thompson, Constitutionalizing, supra
note 158, at 162, 190-91.
281. See Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 94 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973). Even in states with more
basic environmental policy provisions, the trend is inapposite to Pennsylvania. In New York, for
example, which has an environmental policy statement but no environmental right, the courts
have concluded that "if both [environmental and economic] factors were to be placed upon the
scales, the Pro bono publico considerations must prevail." Nattin Realty, Inc. v. Ludewig, 324
N.Y.S.2d 668, 672 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971); see also Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Moorman, 664 So. 2d
930, 933 (Fla. 1995) ("A personal [property] right does not necessarily supervene the rational
concerns of public environmental policy.").
282. Payne, 312 A.2d at 94.
283. Kemmis, supra note 150, at 234-35; see also Pearson & Hutton, supra note 55, at 196;
Mann & Jackson, supra note 279, at 413.
284. Brooks, supra note 3, at 1109.
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gain outweighed an individual's partial loss of liberty."' Scholars taking
issue with the Payne test have also argued that "[t]he public well-being is
clearly superior to any individual's property rights. All property is subject
to the laws which express the public purpose and conscience; for it to be
otherwise would expose vast numbers of people to risks with no recourse
of prevention."'
But even in Pennsylvania a landowner does not have carte blanche to
disregard all environmental regulation. As the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has observed, landowners "who desire to utilize their property to
conduct business in a regulated industry have chosen to subject
themselves to regulations."' In other words, environmental regulation is
an expected part of using land for economic gain. The court has further
held that once adverse environmental impacts are raised, the applicant's
burden of proof is "intensified."' If the government fails to consider and
balance environmental harms in its permitting process, it has abused its
discretion.29 Perhaps the final saving grace for local government is the
court's recognition in Eagle Environmental II that, so long as some
balancing of environmental and social interests occurs, it is not
constitutionally mandatory for governments to apply the Payne test.2" As
argued in Part II, this latitude gives a local government the authority it
needs to more appropriately weigh and protect environmental rights in its
community -particularly when local government decision making
receives deferential review under an abuse of discretion standard.29 1
Illinois and Hawaii also appear to balance interests, but place a much
greater weight on environmental rights. In the context of article XI,
section 1, Hawaii has acknowledged that there is necessarily a balancing
between environmental interests and other economic and social factors,
but that "any balancing between public and private purposes begins with
a presumption in favor of public use."2" Accordingly, the burden lies with
the private developer to justify its use and overcome the presumption.293
The Hawaii Supreme Court has also said that "under no circumstances"
does the constitution allow "minimal scrutiny" of commercial interests
285. Kemmis, supra note 150, at 234-35.
286. Pearson & Hutton, supra note 55, at 182.
287. Eagle Envtl. II v. Commonwealth, 884 A.2d 867, 881 (Pa. 2005).
288. See Commonwealth v. Commonwealth, 335 A.2d 860,865 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975).
289. See Pa. Envtl. Mgmt. Servs., 503 A.2d 477, 480 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986).
290. See discussion supra Part II.B, especially note 132.
291. See id.
292. Waiahole, 9 P.3d 409, 454 (Haw. 2000). Presumably, this constitutional presumption in
favor of the environment overlays HEPA's balancing, which requires that the decision maker
"make a reasoned decision after balancing the risks of harm to the environment against the
benefits to be derived from the proposed action, as well as to make a reasoned choice between
alternatives." Unite Here! Local 5 v. City and Cnty. of Honolulu, 231 P.3d 423, 444 (Haw. 2010).
293. See Waiahole, 9 P.3d at 454.
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when the public trust is at stake.294 Similarly, Illinois cases and the
constitutional commentary state that the right to use property is
outweighed by the obligation to maintain a healthful environment.29
5
However, if an environmental right is constitutionally protected, and
the countervailing land use interests are not, then a balancing test seems
inappropriate.29 Instead, the threshold question should simply be
whether the environmental right is violated. Then, consideration of
economic or other social interests does not come in the form of a
counterbalancing right, but rather in the form of a secondary question of
whether the countervailing interest meets the requisite level of judicial
scrutiny. This, in essence, is the Montana test, which treats environmental
rights as fundamental and requires a compelling interest before a land use
can proceed in the face of environmental harm. 21 In light of this strict
scrutiny, scholars note that Montana's test leaves the least room for
economic tradeoffs. 298
Even if a countervailing property right is constitutionally protected
in a particular case, thus necessitating some form of balancing, Montana's
environmental right is placed first in the list of inalienable rights,
299
suggesting that it is paramount. Indeed, the assertion of a property right
has yielded to environmental rights in prior decisions.
3" Arguably, in
states like Montana and Illinois, where the constitutions place a duty on
each person toward the environment, developers take title to property
subject to this constitutional duty; in essence, the duty "runs with the
land" and encumbers all property."ot
294. In re Contested Case Hearing (Molokai), 174 P.3d 320, 330-31 (Haw. 2007); see
Waiahole, 9 P.3d at 472.
295. See supra note 99 and accompanying text; see also Mann & Jackson, supra note 279, at
413 (discussing Illinois' use of the constitution to interpret authority broadly in favor of the
environment).
296. For similar arguments related to other constitutional rights, see Iddo Porat, The Dual
Model of Balancing: A Model for the Proper Scope of Balancing in Constitutional Law, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 1393, 1396 (2006) ("Are both claims in the conflict first-order claims, in
which balancing is appropriate, or does one of the claims ... function as a second-order claim, in
which case balancing is inappropriate?"); Mark Oring & S.D. Hampton, When Rights Collide:
Hostile Work Environment vs. First Amendment Free Speech, 31 UWLA L. REV. 135, 160 (2000)
("The first step in balancing should be to make sure that it is really necessary and appropriate...
. Are the rights of equal stature[?] . . . [C]onstitutional rights should not be 'balanced' away
unless it is absolutely necessary.").
297. See discussion supra Part II.C.
298. See Thompson, Constitutionalizing, supra note 158, at 190-91.
299. See MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3.
300. See discussion supra Part II.C., especially note 148.
301. See Mann & Jackson, supra note 279, at 405 (noting that even when a constitution
mentions a right to use property, that right "is limited at least to the extent of the obligation to
provide and to maintain a healthful environment"). Reserved for future discussion is the related
question of whether environmental rights thus constitute a background principle of state law that
precludes a takings claim.
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Thus, among the environmental rights states there is a spectrum of
approaches for weighing environmental rights. But in each state a local
government has both an authority and a duty to render land use decisions
that consider and protect the community from environmental harm.
D. Determine the Evidence Necessary to Apply the Criteria
Among the more difficult questions confronting a local government
is whether it possesses the necessary evidence to analyze environmental
harm. Answering this question can be challenging because the types of
evidence vary with the circumstances of each land use proposal.
Nonetheless, the courts have provided local governments with some
general standards that must be met to avoid abuse of discretion.
The Hawaii courts have stated that the governing body must have
"[slufficient information to enable the decision-maker to consider fully
the environmental factors involved and to make a reasoned decision.""
Montana similarly requires that local decision makers have enough
information to take a "hard look" at the environmental impacts of a
project.o30 Implicit in the "hard look" requirement is "the obligation to
make an adequate compilation of relevant information, to analyze it
reasonably, and to consider all pertinent data."" Constitutional
convention delegates in Montana and Illinois also envisioned that
environmental evidence would include medical and technical evidence."
These evidentiary standards are in keeping with statements in early
environmental jurisprudence that "ecological considerations [must be]
based not on whim or fancy but upon scientific findings."'
When the risk of harm may be great, but the harm cannot be shown
with certainty, the cases reflect a judicial trend toward what can loosely
be termed a "precautionary principle,"' which affords governments the
flexibility to impose safeguards until such time as more information is
302. Unite Here! Local 5 v. City and Cnty. of Honolulu, 231 P.3d 423, 444 (Haw. 2010).
303. See Aspen Trails Ranch, LLC v. Simmons, 2010 MT 79, 356 Mont. 41, 230 P.3d 808,
820.
304. Clark Fork Coal. v. Mont. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 2008 MT 407, 347 Mont. 197, 197
P.3d 482,492.
305. See Tobin, supra note 71, at 479, 479 nn.31-32 (citing to the convention records of both
Illinois and Montana).
306. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text (quoting Nattin Realty, Inc. v. Ludewig,
324 N.Y.S.2d 668, 672 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971). For an in-depth discussion regarding the sufficiency
of scientific evidence in land use, see generally Mudd et al., supra note 226; see also Julie Lurman
Joly et al., Recognizing When the "Best Scientific Data Available" Isn't, 29 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 247
(2010).
307. Further discussion of this principle appears, generally, in Jorge E. Vinuales, Legal
Techniques for Dealing with Scientific Uncertainty in Environmental Law, 43 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 437 (2010); Bernard A. Weintraub, Science, International Environmental
Regulation, and the Precautionary Principle: Setting Standards and Defining Terms, 1 N.Y.U.
ENvTL. L.J. 173 (1992).
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known. For example, in Waiahole, the state water commission lacked
sufficient evidence to determine whether water rights applicants could
use the water without causing public harm.' The commission thus
ordered the applicants to contribute to the costs of stream studies and
monitoring to determine whether the permit criteria were satisfied.' The
Hawaii Supreme Court upheld the condition under the precautionary
principle:
Where scientific evidence is preliminary and not yet conclusive . . . it
is prudent to adopt "precautionary principles" in protecting the
resource. That is, where there are present or potential threats of
serious damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be a basis
for postponing effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation .... In addition, where uncertainty exists, a trustee's duty
to protect the resource mitigates in favor of choosing presumptions
that also protect the resource.310
As with any general principle, its meaning must vary according to the
situation and can only develop over time. In this case, we believe the
Commission describes the principle in its quintessential form: at
minimum, the absence of firm scientific proof should not tie the
Commission's hands in adopting reasonable measures designed to
further the public interest. 1
In the lodestar opinion of Ethyl Corp., the United States Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld the Environmental Protection
Agency's authority to regulate in the face of scientific uncertainty:
Regulators such as the [Commission] must be accorded
flexibility, a flexibility that recognizes the special judicial interest
in favor of protection of the health and welfare of people, even in
areas where certainty does not exist.
Questions involving the environment are particularly prone to
uncertainty . . . . Yet the statutes-and common sense-demand
regulatory action to prevent harm, even if the regulator is less
than certain that harm is otherwise inevitable.
Undoubtedly, certainty is the scientific ideal-to the extent that
even science can be certain of its truth . . . . Awaiting certainty[,
however,] will often allow for only reactive, not preventative,
regulation. Petitioners suggest that anything less than certainty,
that any speculation, is irresponsible. But when statutes seek to
avoid environmental catastrophe, can preventative, albeit
uncertain, decisions legitimately be so labeled?
308. Waiahole, 9 P.3d 409,495-96 (Haw. 2000).
309. See id.
310. Id. at 426 (quoting conclusions of law of the state water commission).
311. Id. at 467.
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So defined, the precautionary principle simply restates the
Commission's duties under the constitution ... .312
Thus, according to the Hawaii Supreme Court, the precautionary
principle is a necessary part of implementing environmental rights and
should be applied when governing bodies confront situations of uncertain
evidence and high environmental risk.
Pennsylvania has also embraced the precautionary principle in the
context of local government standing to sue to prevent environmental
harms. In Franklin Township, discussed in Part I.B, the court not only
upheld local government's right to sue the state regarding a toxic waste
landfill permit, but it proceeded to describe the importance of preventing
harm before it occurs: "Toxic wastes which are deposited in the land
irrevocably alter the fundamental nature of the land . . . . We need not
wait until an ecological emergency arises in order to find that the interest
of the municipality and the county faced with such a disaster is
immediate.""' Montana's MEIC case also espoused a form of the
precautionary principle: "Our constitution does not require that dead fish
float on the surface of our state's rivers and streams before its farsighted
environmental protection can be invoked."314
Even in those cases not expressly mentioning the precautionary
principle, the courts have made clear that an environmental harm need
not be definitely proven for a local government to exercise its police
powers. The Illinois case City of Springfield v. Hashman3 15 is illustrative.
There, developers proposed a twenty-lot residential subdivision with
septic tanks on each lot.316 The subject property was near a marsh that
drained into Sugar Creek and then Lake Springfield-the source of the
community drinking water supply."' The property also contained soils
"rated as having moderate to severe limitations for septic tank seepage
fields and the probability of effluent drainage into Sugar Creek [was]
great."3 18 Some nearby properties had already experienced septic system
leakage.' The City denied the proposed development and a trial court
reversed the decision, critiquing the City for not proving that the septic
systems would actually pollute Lake Springfield.3 20 The appellate court,
312. Id. at 466-67 & n. 59 (emphasis omitted) (some internal citations omitted).
313. Franklin Twp. v. Commonwealth, 452 A.2d 718, 722 (Pa. 1982) (plurality opinion).
314. Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr., 1999 MT 248, 296 Mont. 207, 988 P.2d 1236, 1249; see Barry E.
Hill et al., Human Rights and the Environment: A Synopsis and Some Predictions, 16 GEO. INT'L
ENvTL. L. REv. 359, 398-99 (2004) (characterizing the court's test as a form of the precautionary
principle).
315. City of Springfield v. Hashman, 774 N.E.2d 427 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
316. See id. at 430.
317. See id.
318. Id.
319. See id. at 434-36.
320. See id.
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however, upheld the City's decision on appeal, holding that the
"possibility" of septic failure and pollution of the water supply was
sufficient evidence to support the City's decision.32' The Pennsylvania
courts have likewise upheld zoning that excludes uses "likely to" cause
pollution of municipal water supply.322
Expressing a similar sentiment, the Montana Supreme Court in
Madison R.V., Ltd. v. Town of Ennis held that a local government need
not have "definitive professional testimony" before denying a
recreational vehicle park that could overload the town's sewage system
and place the nearby Madison River and its fishery at risk.323 Observing
that there was "considerable testimony raising serious questions about
the effect of adding a recreational vehicle park's waste to the Town's
sewage treatment system," the court upheld the government's decision.324
Although the courts have not expressly adopted a sliding scale
measurement, it is possible to conclude that one exists regarding proof,
where less certainty of harm is required as the significance of the resource
increases. For example, in Tri-County Landfill Co. v. Illinois Pollution
Control Board, " the Illinois Pollution Control Board ordered two
landfill companies to terminate leachate and pollution discharge from
their sites.326 The discharge was entering an upper aquifer that was
separated from a lower aquifer by a layer of clay.327 The lower aquifer
served as a water supply source for South Elgin, Illinois.32 There was
mixed evidence presented on the permeability of the clay, and the Board
issued the order based on a "substantial threat of water pollution to the
lower aquifer."329 The Board concluded it would not "tolerate this danger,
notwithstanding the fact that the time may be distant when such pollution
would, in fact, take place."330 The landfill operators argued that the Board
lacked substantial evidence to support its decision.3 The appeals court
disagreed, holding that:
[T]he Board must be allowed to act where the conduct may endanger
the safety of the citizens, there is no assurance that it will not [occur] .
. . and the result if the potential danger were to be realized would be
321. See id.
322. See Schuster v. Plumstead Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 450 A.2d 799, 801 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1982) (involving a proposed automobile wrecking yard that experts opined would result in
various pollutants seeping into groundwater or combining with surface runoff).
323. Madison River R.V. Ltd. v. Town of Ennis, 2000 MT 15, 298 Mont. 91, 994 P.2d 1098,
1102-03.
324. See id.
325. Tri-Cnty. Landfill Co. v. Ill. Pollution Control Bd., 353 N.E.2d 316 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976).
326. See id.
327. See id.
328. See id. at 320.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. See id. at 318.
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serious. The Board here reasonably found that allowing the discharge
with no knowledge or assurance of the results was a water pollution
hazard considering the nearness of the well and the gravity of the
result which may well occur.332
This same logic is seen in another Illinois case, Village of Glencoe v.
Metropolitan Sanitary District, where an appeals court upheld a district's
authority to ban waste discharges that were "even likely to pollute"
waters of Lake Michigan, notwithstanding the lack of actual proof that
harmful pollution would result.3 The court emphasized that the waters
there were particularly vulnerable: "[T]he problem is especially serious
because the pollution of Lake Michigan is practically irreversible."" The
importance placed on the severity of the potential harm in these cases, as
compared with the level of evidence required, indeed suggests a judicial
sliding scale of proof, albeit an implicit one.
Finally, the cases support the position that a land use applicant bears
the burden of providing the evidence necessary for a full environmental
review. In Hawaii, an applicant must overcome a presumption in favor of
the environment3 5 and bears the burden of establishing that the proposed
use will not interfere with any public trust purposes.336 Under HEPA the
applicant bears the burden as well.337 In the words of the Hawaii Supreme
Court: "[W]hen inconclusive allegations raise a specter of harm that
cannot be dispatched by readily available evidence," the burden is on the
applicant to show no harm or an acceptable level of harm.338 Further,
when an applicant does not meet its burden, the governing body should
stop its analysis rather than grant a permit.3 9 Granting approval based on
a lack of evidence of harm constitutes an impermissible shift of burden
onto the government or other parties asserting environmental rights.'
In Pennsylvania, the applicant carries the burden under the Payne
test, and when adverse environmental impacts are raised, "the applicant's
burden is intensified" and the government "must be satisfied" that the
332. Id. at 324.
333. Vill. of Glencoe v. Metro. Sanitary Dist., 320 N.E.2d 524, 527-28 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974).
334. Id. While the courts appear to apply a precautionary approach in Illinois, the exception
would be where the state legislature has limited standing to challenge certain agency permits,
discussed supra Part II.A.
335. See Waiahole, 9 P.3d 409, 454 (Haw. 2000).
336. See In re Wai'ola 0 Moloka'i, Inc., 83 P.3d 664, 704-05 (Haw. 2004) (concluding that
the government is "duty bound to hold an applicant to its burden during a contested-case
hearing").
337. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 343-5(c) (West 2009).
338. In re Water Use Permit Application (Moloka'i), 174 P.3d 320, 335, 338, 347-48 (Haw.
2007) (citing In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiahole If), 93 P.3d 643, 658 (Haw. 2004)).
339. See id. at 338.
340. See id.
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Payne test is met." The Montana Supreme Court has stated that an
applicant's failure to provide sufficient evidence regarding environmental
harm can result in the voiding of a development approval, particularly
when the applicant fails to include existing environmental studies and
information. 42
E. Make Findings of Fact that Show the
Environmental Right Was Considered
As the local government makes evidentiary findings, a logical but
sometimes overlooked best practice is to make specific findings relating
to environmental rights. Failing to make these findings can constitute
reversible error. In Ka Pa'akai 0 Ka'Aina, for example, Hawaii's LUC
authorized the reclassification of 1000 acres of land from "conservation"
to "urban," which would have allowed Ka'Upulehu Developments (KD)
to expand a luxury resort onto lands traditionally used by native
Hawaiians for fishing and gathering purposes? Before authorizing the
reclassification, the LUC neglected to do the requisite factual inquiry into
the "identity and scope" of the native resources, the extent the resources
would be affected, and how the native rights could be reasonably
protected.' The Supreme Court of Hawaii held:
A review of the record and the LUC's decision leads us to the
inescapable conclusion that the LUC's findings and conclusions are
insufficient to determine whether it discharged its duty to protect
customary and traditional practices of native Hawaiians to the extent
feasible. The LUC, therefore, must be deemed, as a matter of law, to
have failed to satisfy its statutory and constitutional obligations.
The Pennsylvania courts have followed a similar logic, holding that it
would be arbitrary and capricious for the government to issue a decision
341. See Commonwealth v. McCoy, 335 A.2d 860, 865 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975). Discussed in
Cusack, supra note 4, at 193 & n.162.
342. See Aspen Trails Ranch, LLC v. Simmons, 2010 MT 79, 356 Mont. 41, 230 P.3d 808,
812-15, 820-21 (affirming trial court decision to void preliminary plat when developer EA was
lacking required information such as existing groundwater studies); see also Clark Fork Coal. v.
Mont. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 2008 MT 407, 347 Mont. 197, 197 P.3d 482, 491 (finding an abuse
of discretion where agency fails to use its discretion to demand additional relevant evidence).
343. Ka Pa'akai 0 Ka'Aina v. Land Use Comm'n, 7 P.3d 1068, 1074 (Haw. 2000). Although
the case involved native gathering rights, the holding is instructive regarding the failure to issue
findings when a constitutional right is implicated. For a discussion of the use of native
constitutional rights in environmental rights analysis, see supra Part II.D.
344. Ka Pa'akai 0 Ka'Aina, 7 P.3d at 1084.
345. Id. at 1085; see also In re Water Use Permit Application (Moloka'i), 174 P.3d 320, 334
(Haw. 2007) (remanding to state water commission for failing to explain why private commercial
water use took precedent over public trust water use under article XI, section 1).
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without considering "environmental and ecological factors."' Similarly,
in Montana it is arbitrary for a local government to make no
environmental findings when the weight of the evidence shows serious
environmental concerns associated with a development proposal.3
F. Do Not Delegate Review Duties to the Applicant or Approve a
Development Contingent on Future Review of Environmental Rights
Although the applicant carries the evidentiary burden regarding
environmental evidence, the government cannot rely solely on the
applicant to assess the environmental harms posed by a land use
proposal. The ultimate duty to conduct a full environmental review lies
with the local government and cannot be delegated. Nor should the
review be deferred to some future date after an approval has issued. Ka
Pa'akai 0 Ka'Aina is again instructive. There, when the LUC authorized
reclassification of conservation lands for a resort expansion, it required
that the developer "preserve and protect any gathering and access rights
of native Hawaiians," without identifying those rights or explaining how
they would be preserved and protected.' The Hawaii Supreme Court
reversed:
This wholesale delegation of responsibility for the preservation and
protection of native Hawaiian rights to KD, a private entity . . . was
improper and misses the point. These issues must be addressed before
the land is reclassified.
... The LUC's verbatim adoption of KD's conceptual [plan] and [the
landowner's] future study, without any analysis of the project's
impact, violates the LUC's duty to independently assess the impacts
of the proposed reclassification on such customary and traditional
practices.
... [The LUC's condition of approval] ... confers upon KD the
unfettered authority to decide which native Hawaiian practices are at
issue and how they are to be preserved or protected . . . after the
346. Flowers v. Northampton Bucks Cnty. Munic. Auth., 57 Pa. D. & C.2d 274, 279, 283-84
(C.P. Bucks Cnty. Pa. 1972); see also Pa. Envtl. Mgmt. Servs. v. Commonwealth, 503 A.2d 477,
480 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975) (abuse of discretion not to consider environmental harms).
347. See Greater Yellowstone Coal., Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 2001 MT 99, 305 Mont.
232, 25 P.3d 168, 173 (upholding the district court's decision). Below, the district court voided
the local government zoning decision, concluding there was "nothing in the record" and "scant
evidence in the record" to support the local government's finding of public benefit. The evidence
showed just the opposite-that the "extremely sensitive nature of the Duck Creek parcel and its
importance to wildlife habitat ... is a significant factor to be weighed in evaluating the public
welfare . . . ." Findings of Fact no. 98-100, Conclusions of Law no. 21, Greater Yellowstone
Coal., Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty. Conm'rs, Cause No. DV-96-331 (Mont. Dist. Ct. Apr. 19, 2000).
348. See Ka Pa'akai 0 Ka'Aina v. Land Use Comm'n, 7 P.3d 1068, 1086-89 (Haw. 2000).
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development is complete, at some undetermined time and under
indeterminate circumstances.
. . . [A] private petitioner . . . unlike a public body, is not subject to
public accountability. Allowing a petitioner to make such after-the-
fact determinations may leave practitioners of customary and
traditional uses unprotected from possible arbitrary and self-serving
actions on the petitioner's part. After all, once a project begins, the
pre-project cultural resources and practices become a thing of the
past."
In another Hawaii case, Molokai, the state water commission
granted a groundwater use permit to a private commercial user with the
condition that the user conduct a feasibility study for alternative water
supply sources in the future.5 o Although alternative supply is a threshold
question, the permit allowed immediate withdrawals from the Kualapu'u
aquifer, which was close to full allocation and faced risks of increased
chlorides and drawdowns." The court held that the permit condition was
"fundamentally at odds" with the commission's constitutional duties and
that the feasibility of alternative supply should have been considered
before a permit was granted: "The commission cannot fairly balance
competing interests in a scarce public resource if it renders its decision
prior to evaluating the availability of alternative sources of water."352 The
Montana Supreme Court employed a similar analysis in Aspen Trails
Ranch, LLC by holding that the county in that case could not rely on a
subdivision developer's presumption of no environmental harm when
granting preliminary plat approval."'
G. Plan to Monitor for Ongoing Compliance
When a land use is deemed compatible with environmental rights
and is allowed to proceed, the local government arguably has an ongoing
duty to ensure that the permitted activity actually occurs in a manner that
does not harm environmental rights. Again, Hawaii has been the most
outspoken on this issue. In Kelly v. 1250 Oceanside Partners, the court
held that a county's constitutional duty under article XI, section 1, is "to
not only issue permits after prescribed measures appear to be in
349. Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Kahana Sunset Owners Ass'n v. Cnty. of Maui, 947
P.2d 378, 386-87 (Haw. 1981) (holding that it was erroneous for City to delegate environmental
review responsibility to another agency or concerned members of the public when City was the
agency granting approval of a proposed development).
350. Molokai, 174 P.3d 320, 326, 335 (Haw. 2007).
351. See id.
352. Id. at 335; see also Waiahole, 9 P.3d 409, 472 (Haw. 2000) (finding error when
commission deferred rigorously scrutinizing a water use application until some future date when
resources were more scarce).
353. See supra notes 244-247 and accompanying text.
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compliance with state regulation, but also to ensure that the prescribed
measures are actually being implemented . . . ."I There, the county
unsuccessfully argued that it could exercise its discretion in choosing
whether to monitor a subdivision construction site for compliance with
state erosion and runoff requirements.355 And in Morgan v. Planning
Department, the court upheld a County of Kauai decision to modify an
existing special management area permit that had allowed a sea wall on
private properties.356 After the sea wall was built, it began causing erosion
on neighboring properties, so the county imposed new conditions
requiring redesign of the sea wall."' The permit holders argued that the
county lacked authority to revoke or alter an issued permit, but the court
concluded that the county has ongoing jurisdiction over permits under
the CZMA and the Hawaii Constitution.
As Eagle Environmental II illustrates, Illinois similarly acknowledges
that there is an ongoing duty to ensure compliance and that it is
appropriate for government to revoke a permit if environmental harm
exceeds that contemplated under the permit terms.359 And the Montana
Supreme Court has held that an agency abused its discretion when it
assumed that a mining company would perpetually treat pollutants
released from a mining adit, without specifically providing for how
ongoing compliance would occur.6
A final, related issue deals with delays between the time an approval
is issued and the time the developer actually commences the
development of the land-a frequent reality in the fluctuating
marketplace. This issue is exemplified by the case of Unite Here! 5 Local
v. City and County of Honolulu, where a resort developer received
approval to significantly expand a resort but then delayed completion of
the proposed project for over twenty years. 361' The developer argued that
the original project EIS could continue to apply, despite the fact that in
the intervening years the environmental variables around the property
had changed, including increasing reliance on the property by
endangered and threatened species. 62 The Hawaii Supreme Court ruled
354. Kelly v. 1250 Oceanside Partners, 140 P.3d 985, 1011 (Haw. 2006). Discussed supra Part
II.D.
355. Kelly, 140 P.3d at 1009-11.
356. Morgan v. Planning Dep't, 86 P.3d 982, 985, 991-93 (Haw. 2004).
357. See id.
358. See id.; see also Waiahole, 9 P.3d 409, 453, 471-72 (Haw. 2000) (upholding condition on
water use permits that allows water commission to revoke or modify permit in the future as
constitutional obligations may require).
359. See Eagle Envtl. II v. Commonwealth, 884 A.2d 867, 872, 878 (Pa. 2005). Discussed
supra Part II.A, III.B.
360. See Clark Fork Coal. v. Mont. Dep't Envtl. Quality, 2008 MT 407, 347 Mont. 197, 197
P.3d 482,488, 491-92.
361. Unite Here! 5 Local v. City & Cnty. Of Honolulu, 231 P.3d 423, 428, 452. (Haw. 2010).
362. See id.
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that "timing" is a key factor of an environmental review and
environmental issues associated with the property had changed over time,
thus necessitating a new review process.' Practitioners can draw an
important lesson from this case by clearly delimiting the time period
covered by a development approval and requiring developers to submit
new materials if development is delayed.
The topics discussed in this Part reflect a set of common
considerations faced by local governments in the environmental rights
states. Although there are differences among the states, particularly in
the scope and weight of the environmental right, practitioners can
observe remarkable commonality among the states in areas such as the
precautionary principle, applicant burden, mitigation requirements, and
the ongoing duty of monitoring for compliance. This discussion is
admittedly only the beginning of what will necessarily be a much deeper
analysis of each local government's planning and regulatory documents.
And with literally hundreds of local governments working through this
regulatory design process, the communities in these four states will be
able to benefit from the uniquely local and innovative approaches their
peers are taking to implement environmental rights.
CONCLUSION
Local government is the next frontier in environmental rights
protection. The local governments in environmental rights states are
poised to become leaders in this endeavor by creating and implementing
robust environmental land use provisions. Yet that leadership has been
lacking to date. Whereas state agencies in Illinois, Pennsylvania,
Montana, and Hawaii have integrated environmental review into selected
areas of state purview, local governments continue to leave their
environmental authority largely unexercised. Exercising this authority is
not an option, but rather a constitutional mandate that reaches every
level of government. Absent local action, the people of environmental
rights states do not enjoy the full scope of protection guaranteed them by
their constitutions.
Local governments will use a variety of approaches in fulfilling their
constitutional mandates, including strengthening their planning
documents, codifying review criteria, clarifying evidentiary requirements
in the application process, and planning for an ongoing role in monitoring
developer compliance after permits issue. These steps will necessarily be
363. See id.
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informed by reviewing statutory enabling authority and case law, as well
as taking matters to court when other agencies or particular statutes may
impact a community's environmental health. In this process, practitioners
among the environmental rights states will be able to benefit from
studying the differences among the states, as well as the common themes
that serve to inform the regulatory design of all the states.
Even as environmental rights approach their fourth decade of
existence, we are still defining their contours and import. But that process
of ongoing discovery should not hinder local governments from
responding to their constitutional calling now. Be it a "constant and
difficult task," the time has nonetheless come, if indeed it is not already
overdue, for local governments to assume their rightful role in protecting
environmental rights.364
We welcome responses to this Article. If you are interested in submitting a response for our
online companion journal, Ecology Law Currents, please contact ecologylawcurrents@boalt.org.
Responses to articles may be viewed at our website, http://www.boalt.orglelq.
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